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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO. 99-491-CR-KING
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs. MIAMI, FLORIDA
NOVEMBER 29, 1999
SABRETECH, INC.
DANIEL GONZALEZ, MONDAY - 9:00 A.M.
EUGENE FLORENCE
Defendants.
JURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES LAWRENCE KING,
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DAY 9
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE GOVERNMENT:
CAROLINE HECK MILLER, A.U.S.A.
GEOFFREY BRIGHAM, A.U.S.A.
J.L.K. FEDERAL JUSTICE BUILDING
99 N.E. 4th Street
MIAMI, FL 33132 - 305/961-9432
SPECIAL AGENT JOHN LONG
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
SPECIAL AGENT MIKE CLARK
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
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SPECIAL AGENT JACQUELINE FRUGE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOR DEFENDANT SABRETECH:
JANE RASKIN, ESQ.
MARTIN RASKIN, ESQ.
RASKIN & RASKIN, P.A.
2937 S.W. 27th Avenue, Suite 206
MIAMI, FL 33133 - 305/444-3400
NORMAN MOSCOWITZ, ESQ.
SULLIVAN RIVERO & MOSCOWITZ, P.A.
Miami Center, Suite 2550
201 South Biscayne Blvd.
MIAMI, FL 33131 - 305/371-7781
FOR DEFENDANT FLORENCE:
JANE MOSCOWITZ, ESQ.
MOSCOWITZ STARKMAN & MAGOLNICK
100 S.E. 2nd Street, Suite 3700
MIAMI, FL 33131 - 305/379-8300
FOR DEFENDANT GONZALEZ:
ROBERT DUNLAP, ESQ.
DUNLAP & SILVERS, P.A.
2601 S. Bayshore Drive, Suite 601
MIAMI, FL 33133 - 305/854-9666
REPORTED BY:
ROBIN MARIE CARBONELLO
Official Federal Court Reporter
J.L.K. Federal Justice Building
Suite 1127
99 Northeast 4th Street
MIAMI, FL 33132 - 305/ 523-5108
TOTAL ACCESSTM COURTROOM REALTIME TRANSCRIPTION
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INDEX TO WITNESSES
Witnesses: Direct Cross Redirect Recross
Reporter's Certificate ................................. 154
INDEX TO EXHIBITS
Exhibits Marked for Received
Identification in Evidence
Description Page Line Page Line
Government Exhibit 40.......................... 75
Government Exhibits 66, 67A, 67B, 68, 69, 70... 76
Government Exhibits 82, 83 and 84.............. 77
Government Exhibit 96.......................... 78
N PB,D LC,E B
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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MORNING SESSION
9:00 A.M.
COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. Court is in
session. The Honorable Judge James Lawrence King
presiding.
THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated, please.
All right. First, let me inquire of the
Government as to whether or not they have any other
exhibits, in reviewing the files, they ascertain they would
like to offer into evidence.
MS. MILLER: Yes, we do, Your Honor. I hope you
will bear with us, it might take a little while, although I
think it should go smoothly.
First of all, Your Honor, we have entered into
various stipulations which I am going to hand to the Court
at this time. There is one that we entered into last week,
Your Honor, that Ms. Kramerman has the original of that also
will be applicable. I don't know if we have that in the
court right now.
Ms. Kramerman has given me back one stipulation.
I'm handing the Court back five more, for a total of six
stipulations.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. What else do
you have?
MS. MILLER: We would also like to move into
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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evidence, Your Honor, certain self-authenticating
documents, I believe, with the nonobjection of counsel.
THE COURT: Do you want to do that when the jury
comes back? We will only take up those that we have
objections to at this time.
MS. MILLER: Well, Your Honor, counsel has
tentatively told me that there are no objections, but I
don't want to be taken by surprise. So I think it might
save time to go over --
THE COURT: Hand them to them and ask them if
there are any objections.
MS. MILLER: I will ask Ms. Breshay to hand the
following exhibits to the defense.
THE COURT: I don't want to waste time going
through them all now. If there's no objection to them,
then all you have to do, when we resume with the jury, is
to offer an exhibit. Just say it will be offered without
objection as Exhibit 102, a letter dated such and such, or
whatever, and then we move right on.
The same thing with the stipulations. All you
have to do, if they are stipulated to, is just stand up and
read them to the jury when we resume.
MS. MILLER: May I consult with counsel for a
moment, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Sure. How many of these exhibits do
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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you have? Maybe we'll just take a ten-minute recess and
let them see what you all are talking about.
MS. MILLER: Why don't we do that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I've received this morning a
memorandum from the Government involving anticipated Rule
29 motions. If the defendants or lawyers have any matters
that they would like me to consider I will be glad to do
that.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: I assume the Government is
resting, except for the stipulations, Your Honor?
MS. MILLER: Well, we will enter the stipulations
and introduction of evidence, Your Honor. We would be
resting after that.
Your Honor, this morning we actually filed two
memoranda of law.
THE COURT: What I have here, filed this morning
at 7:27, is United States memorandum of law concerning
knowledge and intent. Another one, memorandum as to
federal jurisdiction concerning 18 USC 1001.
Now, I have handed to me Defendant Danny
Gonzalez's motion for judgment of acquittal. Those are the
three things I have. I haven't read any of them.
MS. MILLER: We also today filed proposed jury
instructions.
THE COURT: Okay. Good. All right, you will let
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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me know when you've gone through all the exhibits.
[There was a short recess].
COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. Court is in
session. The Honorable Judge James Lawrence King
presiding.
THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated, please. Have
we resolved the stipulations and the exhibits?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, we have narrowed the
areas that call for the Court's resolution. We have
entered into one provisional stipulation. And if the Court
will forgive me, I have put it on yellow paper.
THE COURT: Perfectly all right. Make a copy for
everybody when you get a chance.
What are the exhibits in issue, please?
MS. MILLER: There are three exhibits which we
wish to offer to which the defense has objections.
The first one, Your Honor, is Government Exhibit
29, which you may recall is this model of the PSU that is
sitting under the table.
THE COURT: Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 for
identification, and it appears to be a boxed model -- yes,
I am familiar with it. That is the unit that the mechanics
were placing in the overhead bins that contained the unit
of the oxygen canisters and the masks and the drop cords
and the cables, et cetera.
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It's a three-unit thing and the last time the
defense had a comment about it, they were saying that this
aircraft only had a two-unit thing, so it was not exactly
representative of the unit. I think that was -- there may
be more objection to it, but that what they said the last
time, a week or so ago.
MS. MILLER: That's correct, Your Honor.
Actually it is four-man unit. Their objection was that
these aircraft only went up to three-man units.
THE COURT: Is that the same objection or is
there further objection?
MS. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, actually they had
three-man on one side and four-man on the other. The
objection is that it is really just a demonstrative
exhibit. It's not evidence in the case. We are happy for
the Government to show it to the jury but do not think it
should go into the jury room.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The jury
will be instructed that with respect to Government Exhibit
29 for identification, that it was a model that was
supplied to the Government by the manufacturer.
It is not something that was recovered from the
crash site, not something that was installed in this
airplane, but is for -- as an example of the type of unit
that we have been discussing in the case, or something to
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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that effect, a limiting instruction to that effect. And
the weight they give to it is entirely up to the jury.
What is your next one?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, the next one, if I may
approach the Court, is Government Exhibit 95.
THE COURT: 95 for identification. It helps if
you always add that because until they are admitted, then
we know what we are talking about.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 will be admitted when it
is offered in front of the jury. We don't need to repeat
any objections. Your objections are fully logged in the
record and you are not waiving them by not reasserting them
in the presence of the jury.
The next one is Plaintiff's Exhibit 95 for
identification. What is it, please?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, the parties have agreed
to the authenticity of this document, but not as to
materiality.
This document is a letter agreement from the
President of SabreTech, a man named Steve Towns, to an
official at ValuJet, David Gentry, dated May 1, 1996. It
relates to the lateness of the MD-80s at a time that is
highly pertinent to our case.
Mr. Towns, in this letter, acknowledges that there
has been schedule slippage with regard to the MD-80 program
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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in Miami and offers a potential monetary compensation to
ValuJet for continue the lateness of the project.
Specifically the letter states that --
THE COURT: I can read the letter, yes. Thank
you. There is a two-page document in this envelope. It's
signed on the second page, Steve Towns, President.
The parties have agreed that there's no need to
authenticate it as such. There's no need to bring
Mr. Towns in to authenticate this as his document sent or
the other gentleman, Mr. Gentry, as received, but the issue
is materiality.
I will hear from counsel for the defense.
Mr. Raskin.
MR. RASKIN: Thank you, Your Honor. As the Court
can see, this is a letter from Steve Towns, who is the
President of SabreTech. He is located in Phoenix, Arizona
and has no relationship to this case, not a co-conspirator,
to David Gentry, who also is a ValuJet official in Atlanta,
who is also not a co-conspirator in this case.
The only way that this letter even gets into the
SabreTech Miami facility is because --
THE COURT: Pardon me. So I understand
factually, before you leave the lack of conspiratorial
involvement, the stationery says, SabreTech Liner Company
and it's addressed to Vice President ValuJet Airlines.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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You are suggesting the individuals are not
alleged co-conspirators.
MR. RASKIN: That's correct.
THE COURT: But as I understand it, this is the
same SabreTech -- or is it the same SabreTech?
MR. RASKIN: It's the same SabreTech.
THE COURT: So this was written by the President
of one of the defendants to ValuJet Airlines?
MR. RASKIN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. RASKIN: It comes into the SabreTech
facility, according to the cc, and goes to Jamie Galindo,
who is the general manager of the Miami facility, also not
a defendant an not an unindicted co-conspirator.
There has been no evidence whatsoever in this
case that any of the unindicted co-conspirators or the
defendants in this case were aware of this or acted in
conformity with this. I think it's extremely prejudicial
to hold these people to knowledge that the evidence
certainly does not support that they were in possession of.
There's nothing in the record to show that
Mr. Gonzalez knew that this letter existed, certainly that
Mr. Florence knew that this letter existed, or any of the
identified co-conspirators even knew that this letter
existed.
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Based on that, it is irrelevant. It's certainly
prejudicial because it establishes -- or is seeking to
establish the only motive in this case, that this was a
conspiracy for profit. Unfortunately, the Government
hasn't shown that any of these defendants acted with that
motive or knew that this letter even existed. So it's
really a relevancy and prejudice argument, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Yes, Mr. Dunlap?
MR. DUNLAP: I just want to briefly echo what
Mr. Raskin said, and that is, to Danny Gonzalez this is
hearsay. It is true that he is charged in a criminal
conspiracy with a corporation, but it is our position that
by electing to charge a corporation, the Government can in
no way ameliorate the confrontation rights engrafted in
Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
That is to say, while the corporation may be
charged, it can only be found guilty through criminal mens
rea, specific people within its corporate ambit and who
were acting as members of the cooperation.
The corollary of that would be that anything said
by members or people in the cooperation outside of Danny
Gonzalez's presence who are not his co-conspirators, even
though it may have occurred during the course of a
conspiracy, is not admissible against him and that
801(d)(2)(E) still must fully apply. Thank you.
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THE COURT: Would you and Mr. Raskin, before I
turn to Ms. Miller, would you care to comment upon the
evidence that is in the record, as I recall it at least,
and I may be in error on this, but as I recall, there is
some evidence in this record indicating that around the
facility that the supervisors or bosses, officers of
SabreTech, came to the mechanics that were working on these
planes and urged them to -- I believe the word was, get on
with it, get it cleaned up, get it going, get it done.
Mr. Raskin was just talking about it and I, of
course, should address this more to him than to you,
Mr. Dunlap. And he's standing, obviously ready to rush in,
to substitute for -- not that you're an alien quarterback
like quarterback Marino. Quarterback Huard is about to
come in for Marino, is that it?
He had argued a moment ago that there was nothing
that showed that anybody had had any knowledge of this
letter. Of course, he is absolutely correct. But the
question would not be, I think, whether they knew of the
letter, but whether they knew of any -- if they have been
told, we have got to get this done, we have to get it out of
here, we are overdue, we are over time, words to that
effect.
What this is, is an invitation for you all to
respond to that before she gets up, not anticipating her
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argument, but so we don't have to bounce back and forth.
Do either one of you have anything you want to
talk about?
MR. DUNLAP: If I recall the testimony the Court
is referring to correctly, I believe that it had to do with
a statement by one of the witnesses, either Rodriguez or
Taber, that some supervisor had directed them to clean up
the hangar area in general. And I think that related to
the Government's attempt to introduce an audit by
Continental Airlines -- remember the Court didn't allow
that in -- who was at that time considering sending work to
SabreTech.
It doesn't have anything to do, that particular
reference, with this letter which is between SabreTech
corporate offices and ValuJet, I gather, with respect to
this ValuJet plane.
THE COURT: What about the testimony of one of
the first witnesses two weeks ago, whenever it was, the
gentleman who was the owner's representative there, and I
have forgotten his name, but the gentleman who was a tech
rep or whatever he was called, didn't he offer some
testimony?
Again, it's up to the jury whether they believe
any of this or not, the weight to give to it. But it's in
the record to the effect that he was badgering somebody or
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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pressuring somebody at SabreTech to get the planes done and
get them out, they were overdue. Help me out. Refresh my
recollection.
MR. DUNLAP: That witness was William Drechsler,
Your Honor. His testimony -- I, of course, will discuss
that more at length during my Rule 29 allocution. But his
testimony really involved a business matter that, in our
view, really has no direct or any relevance on the issue
before the jury, which at that time was whether or not
Danny Gonzalez falsified a specific work card.
He was called --
THE COURT: I know the purpose. But didn't he --
from that, is there not evidence in the record, and the
Government could argue, I think, to the jury that the
owners were putting pressure on SabreTech to get the
airplanes out and get them back in service?
MR. DUNLAP: Mr. Drechsler represented Aserca,
Your Honor, a completely different airline than ValuJet,
which is the contract that is at issue in the letter the
Court is examining.
Now, he, if I recall his testimony correctly,
said that he was dissatisfied, as the representative of
Aserca, with the delivery date and the rate of completion
of work on a DC9 aircraft, and that was the first aircraft,
a 705, that was the subject of his handwritten letter, and
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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that he raised some concerns with SabreTech about getting
those planes out.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, may I just add to
that?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: That testimony relates to
something that took place in December of 1995, five months
earlier. His testimony concerned a totally different
aircraft, totally different schedule, and five months
before this letter, so it has nothing to do with this.
There was also no penalty cards involved with that
aircraft, Your Honor.
MR. DUNLAP: If I may, Your Honor, SabreTech
wasn't even incorporated at the time this was going on.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else with respect to
Government Exhibit 95 for identification, being the letter
of May 1, anything further from the defense?
MS. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. It doesn't
relate at all to Mr. Florence. And there's certainly no
testimony whatever that would link it to Mr. Florence in
any way.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. DUNLAP: I would make the same statement as
Ms. Moscowitz referring --
THE COURT: I understand. I treated your
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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summation as a request for a limiting instruction, even if
it is admitted, to the individual defendants as
distinguished from the corporate defendant.
All right, Ms. Miller, we have the objection to
the entire document as not being relevant for the reasons
you heard; and secondarily, by the individual defendants for
a limiting instruction even if it is otherwise admissible
and relevant.
Your response to their argument, please?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, the document is
relevant, highly relevant, and for exactly the reasons that
the Court was recalling. Because there was testimony that
at this time and in relationship to this project, the
MD-80s, there was time pressure. The time pressure was
coming from Danny Gonzalez, among other people.
The Court may recall Government Exhibit 36, which
I am handing up, which was what we are calling the
7-day-a-week memorandum, which was issued by Mr. Gonzalez
on April 26, 1996, saying that due to the press of work on
the MD-80s, people would be working seven days a week from
then on. That is immediately prior to this letter.
Your Honor, within days after this letter, on May
4, 1996, and we know the date from the testimony of Robert
Rodriguez, we have the incident in which there was a press
to get paperwork signed in order to get 802 out the door.
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You may recall the testimony that the other two
MD-80s had gone, but 802 had not, and there was a press to
get that aircraft out the door. That was the day that
workmen were summoned to the work booth. At the work booth,
Eugene Florence was in the booth working with papers.
John Taber has testified that the papers that were
in the booth that day were the oxygen generator papers.
John Taber also testified that on that day he was told by
his lead mechanic that we needed to get this paperwork
signed off. John Taber other mechanics balked saying they
weren't going to sign anything until they read it.
Mr. Casamere called him over and said, "Johnny,
could you please sign these items off." He signed some
papers, but with regard to others, he said he was a little
greasy right now. "I wanted to read what I was signing, if
I did." Danny Gonzalez stood up and said, "We need this
paperwork signed now."
At that time, Mr. Taber did not sign further
paperwork, but he saw Mr. Florence signing paperwork with
Danny Gonzalez at his side.
The Government submits that all of this is
certainly enough to show the relevance of this document. It
fits in and further establishes a point which has been
alleged by the indictment, which is that there was an
atmosphere of haste and putting profit above other concerns.
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The letter demonstrates the profit motive.
It also demonstrates the reason for the haste
which other witnesses and documents have attested to. It
should be admitted.
Further, Your Honor, because of the evidence
showing that both Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Florence were aware
of this time pressure related to these aircraft, the
Government submits that no limiting instruction is required.
THE COURT: Now, the defense -- with respect to
this last issue, the defense has suggested that the two
individual defendants didn't know of the letter and they
shouldn't be charged with knowledge of the letter. There's
no evidence to show that they did, in fact, know of the
letter which was sent to the defendant SabreTech.
What theory would you advance, what legal theory
would you advance that it should apply to them
individually, or that the jury should consider it and weigh
it and give whatever weight they want to give to it, but
they should consider it with respect to the individual
defendants? What legal theory?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, the evidence does not go
farther than what I have suggested, which is that these
defendants were aware of the time pressure related to the
MD-80s. The Government has not produced evidence that the
individual defendants knew of this particular letter.
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However, because of the close fit of this
individual letter in time and in substance with
Mr. Gonzalez's 7-day-a-week memorandum, we feel that it is
a fair inference.
With regard to Mr. Florence, again, he was
present in the booth at the time of the remarks that
reflected this time pressure related to the MD-80s.
THE COURT: All right, the objection is overruled
in part and granted in part. It is overruled as to the
relevancy and materiality and prejudicial effect. It is
admitted into evidence with respect to the defendant
SabreTech for all purposes.
With respect to the individuals, a limiting
instruction will be given, that the jury may give it such
weight as they deem appropriate, but they may not consider
it in determining the case as it pertains to Eugene
Florence and Daniel Gonzalez.
What is next?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, there is but one exhibit
left that is in contention. That is Government's Exhibit
52, which is the cockpit voice recording. Does the Court
wish to see a copy of it?
THE COURT: All right. I have it in front of me.
It is Government's Exhibit 52 for identification.
MS. MILLER: Again, Your Honor, authenticity and
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foundation have been stipulated to. Counsel's argument is
one challenging materiality and raising concerns of
prejudice.
With regard to prejudice, Your Honor, the
Government submits that the transcript --
THE COURT: Excuse me. Every document you
introduce is prejudicial to the defense or you wouldn't be
offering it. So that really not -- the question is whether
or not the prejudice outweighs the probative value. So it
is not a question of whether it is prejudicial. Let me
assume it is because I don't think you would be offering it
if it wasn't helpful to your case and prejudicial to the
defense.
So what we are talking about here is, does the
prejudicial value outweigh -- does the prejudice outweigh
the probative value of the document? Let's deal with the
materiality or relevancy first and then we will determine
the other issues second.
There is an objection that this document is not
material, is that it? I should be asking them, I suppose.
Maybe it's better for me to hear from Ms. Moscowitz first,
if I may interrupt you.
MS. MILLER: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Ms. Moscowitz?
MS. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, our argument, I
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guess, is three-fold. One is the prejudicial value is
greater than the probative value.
The other is it is irrelevant in the sense that
it is not anything that the Government is required to prove
under the charges it has brought.
The third thing is it's really hearsay. It's
offered for the truth and parts of it at least are hearsay.
With respect to the necessity of the Government
for putting it in or why it is -- it's probative value, we
have stipulated that this plane crashed and that everybody
aboard it died. The Government has extensively proved the
damage to the plane through its expert witness, Larry Fogg.
The transcript adds only those horrifying last
moments and, I submit, will make it impossible for the jury
to process the evidence, the charges that relate back to
things that happened before the crash, which the Government
has already acknowledged in opening that nobody intended to
have happen or even foresee would happen.
All the facts that are in there, from the
Government's point of view, are in the record already, fire
damage, resulting fatalities, crash in the Everglades.
There is nothing more relevant to the facts of this case
that is added. It doesn't say anything about oxygen
generators.
In fact, Mr. Fogg already gilded the lily and
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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added more about oxygen generators than is borne out by the
transcript. For that reason, we are just enormously
concerned that it will sweep away the jury's ability to
consider the evidence.
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Miller, you have
heard the argument. What is the materiality?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, the defense has already
established through its opening statement and through its
cross-examination of Mr. Fogg that --
THE COURT: Well, their opening statement didn't
establish anything. They can't argue that as part of this
record. Neither one of you can. Your opening statements
are not evidence in this record that can be considered by
the jury. I hope none of you launch off and say, well,
you heard me say in opening that something happened, that
the spark plug didn't work. If you haven't proven that,
then you can't argue it.
I don't mean to interrupt you, but opening
statement has no meaning.
MS. MILLER: I take your point, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now, the materiality to this case of
Exhibit 52 for identification, which is the cockpit voice
recorder of the plane that tragically crashed, what is the
materiality?
MS. MILLER: In cross-examination of Mr. Fogg,
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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Your Honor, the defense challenged the proposition that the
fire had its origin with the oxygen generators and instead
proposed that the fire had an electrical origin. Indeed,
they used the transcript, or a sentence of the transcript
to try to establish that.
The transcript in its totality --
THE COURT: Didn't he respond to that and clear
that point up?
MS. MILLER: Well, Your Honor, it's a question of
whether he cleared it up or whether the jury was left with
this impression.
THE COURT: Excuse me. He answered that question
about that discreet portion of the transcript. Now you
wish to offer the whole thing. How would offering the
whole transcript bolster or change anything that was
brought out by the cross-examination question on that one
area and his response thereto?
In other words, would it help to show that later
on somebody cried out, we are crashing, or something to the
effect? I submit to you, no, it wouldn't make any
difference. I think they correctly read him whatever they
read him, or correctly referred to it, unless you suggest
otherwise and I invite your comment.
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, the transcript as a
whole shows that up to the moment that Ms. Moscowitz
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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indicated there was no indication of an electrical problem.
The transcript shows the APU and electric is set. It shows
that the electrical panel is set.
THE COURT: Didn't Fogg say all of that?
MS. MILLER: No, I don't believe so. This occurs
prior to the portion that --
THE COURT: Didn't Fogg -- when she said, how
about the electrical comment, he cleared it all up, didn't
he? He may not have used the exact words, well, the first
20 minutes of the recorder didn't mention it or whatever.
But didn't he clear it all up and say that 11 seconds later
there was a cry of "fire" and that there would not have
been 11 seconds -- I think introducing this lengthy
document, some 31 pages, gets into a lot of things that
have nothing to do with the electrical fire.
Go ahead and make your argument.
MS. MILLER: I think -- although Your Honor
doesn't accept my argument, I think you already see where
I'm going. I think this cross-examination has the
potential for creating a misimpression of the minds of the
jury.
And although you feel comfortable that Mr. Fogg
refuted it, I think the Government is entitled to refute it
with the entire transcript which shows no evidence of any
electrical problem either before this incident, this remark
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
26
that was made, or later on.
Further, Your Honor, the statements in the
transcript as to where the fire occurred, i.e. in the
passenger cabin, as opposed to the cockpit, further
bolsters the Government's theory that the fire originated
in the cargo hold and then moved up into the passenger
cabin. It may be, Your Honor, also that as --
THE COURT: You don't think there's enough
evidence in the record that you can make that argument from
Fogg's answer?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, I understand and I
anticipate --
THE COURT: No, that's a simple question. We are
dealing with the voice recorder indicating that someone in
the passenger cabin said "fire" and that was 11 seconds
afterward. Didn't Fogg's testimony that someone in the
passenger cabin yelled "fire" 11 seconds later -- that
gives you all the arguments you need to argue to the jury
that the fire apparently occurred in the passenger cabin
and that is what the Government contends all along.
Why do you need all the other evidence about the
tragedy to argue that? It's a friendly question.
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, it just doesn't seem
fair to me that the defense can selectively take a portion
of this transcript, use it and then retreat and object to
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
27
the rest of it being used.
THE COURT: The difficulty with what you are now
suggesting is that since there was no objection by the
Government and let it go ahead and now we get into all this
little pig trail through the palmettos, as some of my old
cracker friends would say, that now we can dump all of that
in front of the jury and let them wade through it.
All you had to do was object. This wasn't in
evidence and there was no objection. Maybe that was a
strategical decision to entrap them into getting into
something that would then create an argument that the whole
thing can come into evidence.
Frankly, it wasn't admissible. The document
wasn't in evidence. I think everyone has created their own
problem and I think, basically, the answer to it is that
the prejudicial value vastly outweighs any probative value,
if any. I don't think the document, Exhibit 52, is
necessary or needed to buttress anything Mr. Fogg said. I
think Mr. Fogg cleared up that one point very clearly.
I think there are plenty of facts in this record
which the Government can argue what they wish to argue,
which is that the fire started -- or was first detected in
the passenger cabin, started in the hold, came into the
passenger cabin and the electrical issue has nothing to do
with the case.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
28
Therefore, the objection is sustained. I find
that it is highly prejudicial and irrelevant to any of the
issues that are now pending before the Court.
We have also the stipulation of the plane crash
and that it was -- I'm taking from everyone's submission
that there's nothing in this document about the oxygen
generators. I have not read through it.
MS. MILLER: No, there is not, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Then the objection is sustained. It
will be marked as an exhibit for identification not to be
argued to the jury or go to the jury, except as it was
brought out in the questioning by, I think, Ms. Moscowitz
about the fire and Mr. Fogg's response thereto. You all
can argue that. That is in the record without objection.
But this document and all the rest of the
material that is in there will not be argued to the jury.
You can argue to the jury that there was a tape
recorder or a cockpit voice recorder and all that, but not
all the other materials or matters that come forth therein.
Any other exhibits that are still in contest?
MS. MILLER: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: When we resume, then, we will --
MS. MILLER: Judge, there are some matters we
seek some clarification on before resting.
As the Court knows, we offered to produce a
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
29
witness from the FAA to testify with regard to his oversight
for FAA materials. A motion in limine was made by the
defense and granted to preclude that testimony.
We want to make sure that we don't fall between
two stools and later face an argument that either pursuant
to the recent Supreme Court case, United States v. Gauden,
or otherwise, the Government had to prove as a fact some
issue related to FAA jurisdiction.
That witness is here and available and if the
parties agree that the issue of FAA jurisdiction is an issue
of law, we certainly don't wish to present him to testify to
something which we agree is a pure issue of law. But
neither do we wish to face a situation where later on, or
very soon, once we rest, the claim will be made that there
is an issue of fact that we have failed to prove, because
that witness is here and available to testify.
THE COURT: What is the witness's name?
THE WITNESS: Hoke Weiss, W-e-i-s-s.
THE COURT: I will interpret this as a motion by
the Government to call Mr. Hoke Weiss as a witness for the
plaintiff. What is the defense position?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, our position is the
same as it was last week, that this is inappropriate
testimony insofar as we understand he is being called to
testify as to the scope of the FAA's jurisdiction over the
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
30
records in this case. That testimony is simply his
interpretation and opinion of a legal issue.
The FAA's legal jurisdiction is defined by the
CFRs relating to the FAA, and that is law that is for the
Court to give the jury.
The issue of jurisdiction as an element of 1001,
which is whether these statements are within the
jurisdiction of the agency, is a factual issue.
THE COURT: Factual or legal?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: The application to the evidence
in this case is factual. The scope --
THE COURT: It's not a legal issue, under Rule
29, as to whether or not 1001 applies to a document
required by the Department of Transportation and the FAA to
be maintained in the course of repairing an aircraft?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: The issue would be, Your Honor,
whether it applies to the documents in this case.
THE COURT: That's the decision the jury would
make if it gets that far, upon appropriate instruction.
The instruction, I presume, if it goes to the jury, would
be that the work records, or the correct terminology for
those documents, whatever that correct terminology be, that
those documents are official documents within the purview
and the meaning of 1001, which is defined as such and such
and such and such. Then they would take that into
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
31
consideration.
But it wouldn't be -- I don't see that as a
factual issue for the jury. But if it is a factual issue
and you have an expert that wants to come in and say
they're not within that realm and they have one that is,
thus making a totally factual issue with no instructions on
it at all, then I suppose we can do that.
But I don't want to be confronted with a problem
that we spend two or three days having people testify as to
what you all consider to be a factual issue and then come
along, whoever loses that issue, or somehow you want that
instruction on a definition of what is an official document
within the purview of Section 1001.
I think I'm hearing it that the defense wants it
both ways. I may be wrong about that. I'm not accusing
you of anything. It's just a friendly inquiry.
Isn't this a matter of proper jury instruction as
to what is a definition of an official document?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, sir. Just to anticipate
where this is going so I don't want you to think we are
trying to have it both ways, we believe that the issue of
the FAA's jurisdiction is defined as a matter of law under
the appropriate regulations of the FAA. Those regulations
say which records are within the scope of the FAA's
jurisdiction. That's a legal matter for the Court.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
32
THE COURT: If you win that argument, you don't
have to worry about the factual issue.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Now, what the factual issue is,
is whether the particular records here come within the
scope of that legal jurisdiction. That's not a matter, it
seems to me, that an FAA inspector can give testimony on,
his opinion that these records are within my jurisdiction.
THE COURT: Once the Court makes a determination
after listening to both sides on this issue, that issue is
then a finished and completed issue, subject only to
appropriate instructions to the jury, whichever way it may
flow.
I have reviewed the documents that the defense,
through Mr. Dunlap's written submission, have made and that
the Government has made on this issue. I think I continue
to be of the same opinion I have been since we had our
preliminary discussions about these matters in the various
appeals from the Magistrate Judge's orders, that these are
basically legal issues that are the subject of proper
instructions to the jury and proper ruling -- and ruling at
the Rule 29 stage of the proceedings.
I don't think that somebody's opinion as to
whether or not something is an official statement within
the meaning of Section 1001 is of any relevancy to this
jury; that is, I don't think some witness's opinion, no
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
33
matter how long he has worked for the FAA and no matter how
much experience he has had, I can't imagine that that would
be relevant evidence.
So, to that extent I am denying the Government's
motion to present Mr. Weiss at this point in time and I
will consider these matters on the Rule 29 arguments and at
instructions to the jury, if we get that far.
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, I take it that although
Mr. Moscowitz has argued this point, this is the position
of the other defendants. I really would like to get that
on the record.
MR. DUNLAP: Absolutely, Your Honor.
MS. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, sir.
MS. MILLER: Thank you. Finally, Your Honor,
just as we are prepared to go forward and argue the Rule
29s without having put our final exhibits in evidence,
there is one other possible witness we may call. She --
THE COURT: Let me say that for purposes of Rule
29, these documents have been admitted into evidence:
Exhibit 29, with a limiting instruction, and Exhibit 95,
with a limiting instruction.
Additionally, there are two which you now just
read into the record the exhibits that you all have agreed
are admissible, the weight to be decided by the jury, but
that are admissible into evidence that have not yet been
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
34
offered but now are being offered without objection. Read
the numbers, please.
MS. MILLER: Government Exhibit 40, Government
Exhibit 40A, Government Exhibit 66 -- these are all for
identification, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, you will read the numbers and
you don't have to say, because you have stipulated, and at
the end of it I will say simply that they are all admitted
into evidence.
MS. MILLER: 66, 67A, 67B, 68, 69, 70, 82, 83,
84, 96.
THE COURT: Is that all of them?
MS. MILLER: That is, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me inquire of counsel, defense
counsel, have you had an opportunity to review these
exhibits and do you have any objections to any of them?
MS. MOSCOWITZ: We have had an opportunity and we
don't have objections.
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Moscowitz. I will
assume that all counsel have joined in that statement.
MR. RASKIN: Other than the objections we have
already made.
THE COURT: Yes, of course. any objections you
have already made to any of these documents heretofore will
be preserved in the record.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
35
With that statement, the Court will admit into
evidence those documents which have just been enumerated by
Ms. Heck Miller together with Exhibit 29 and 95, as
heretofore ruled.
Now then, the Court will recognize the
stipulations that you all have entered into, being seven in
number. Those stipulations, at the appropriate time, will
be read to the jury together with the introduction of all of
these documents that we have just discussed.
All right. Now, so that we will all understand
where we are, the Government now, I believe, is prepared to
rest its case, subject only to the rulings we have made here
this morning; is that right?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, as I was saying, there
is one witness that we may wish to present. She is coming
in over the lunch hour. She would be bolstering,
basically, testimony about a document that is already in
evidence.
THE COURT: That's fine. I don't need to go into
that. I just need to have the record complete and the
Government resting before I consider Rule 29 arguments. If
you wish to do this after lunch, that's fine.
We are at a point where, if we have the record
complete, then we can go forward with the Rule 29 arguments.
If not, then we have to wait. It's all right with me.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
36
MS. MILLER: Unfortunately, Your Honor, we really
won't know until we meet with her at noon.
THE COURT: That won't help us with several hours
of Rule 29 motions, will it?
MS. MILLER: Excuse me, Your Honor.
Your Honor, we think that it would make more
sense to proceed with the Rule 29 motions now. We will
forego this witness. We are ready to rest.
THE COURT: Do you rest?
MS. MILLER: The Government rests.
THE COURT: The Government has rested, subject
only to these matters we have discussed here and which will
be presented to the jury when the jury comes back. But the
record now is complete.
Are you ready to proceed or do you wish a few
minutes of recess before we start the Rule 29 motions?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Can we have a five-minute recess,
Your Honor?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, with regard to the
defense case, this was the Thanksgiving weekend. Frankly,
we had some difficulty rounding people up. We have three
witnesses who will be available this afternoon.
I can tell the Court that starting tomorrow
morning, without any interruptions, we will put on the
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
37
remainder of our witnesses tomorrow morning. But given the
difficulty finding people here in town and making travel
plans over this weekend, it was difficult to have everybody
here today.
THE COURT: Do you have some witnesses here
today?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, we do.
THE COURT: All right.
[There was a short recess].
THE COURT: At this juncture, the Government has
rested and we will hear from counsel with respect to any
motions they care to make.
MR. DUNLAP: May I be heard first, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Certainly.
MR. DUNLAP: Your Honor, at this time, on behalf
of Danny Gonzalez we renew all of our pretrial motions
particularly the motion dealing with multiple conspiracies.
I would also move under Rule 29 for the entry of a judgment
of acquittal on all counts for Mr. Gonzalez.
The Court has received only this morning our
motion and memorandum, first one to Rule 29. I've done my
best to catalog the evidence as it came in at trial against
Mr. Gonzalez. It's kind of unique in my experience to be
making a Rule 29 argument that seems to me is one based on
such a complete dearth of evidence to support any of the
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
38
charges against Mr. Gonzalez.
Essentially, the Government's case rises and
falls, as I have always believed it would, on the
allegation that Mr. Gonzalez had an argument with Chris
DiStefano and that on or about the time of that argument --
this is the evidence the Government sought to prove --
Mr. Gonzalez falsified a work card. That work card is R
45904, I believe in evidence as Government Exhibit 2.
The facts in the light most favorable to the
evidence -- to the Government indicates that the Government
has not in any way shown that the work called for on that
work card was not accomplished. The Government has offered
evidence to show merely that Christopher DiStefano saw
Mr. Gonzalez place the work card on a table at the
conclusion of a heated argument.
The evidence, through Mr. DiStefano, has shown
that prior to that argument work had been done on that
plane. The plane had gone through the induction process
which involves the running of operational checks on the
plane.
Mr. Drechsler testified that R 45904, or the
worked called for on the card, is one of those checks that
is preferred to be done prior to the plane entering the
hangar.
More importantly, neither Mr. DiStefano nor
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
39
Mr. Quan could in any way say that that work card -- that
the work had not been done on that work card prior to the
argument. They couldn't even testify that the work card had
not been filled out prior to the argument. Mr. DiStefano
candidly stated that he did not see Mr. DiStefano -- or
Mr. Gonzalez sign the work card.
This is where the evidence is so glaringly
insufficient on that, that I wonder what more I could say on
the matter. There simply is no proof that the work, in
fact, was not done. There is, I guess, a set of
circumstances that the Government wants to point to that
they believe in the aggregate or they will argue in the
aggregate provide a basis to send the question of whether or
not that work card was falsified to the jury.
That work card, as I said -- the allegation that
that is false, I think the Court recognized before I even
made this motion and certainly I think can see after
reviewing the catalog of evidence that I put in this motion,
is the beginning and the end of the case.
But for that work card, the Government has put in
evidence through two mechanics, Rodriguez and Taber, that
Mr. Gonzalez was in a work booth and they, I think,
attempted to fix the date on that as about May 4, 1996, when
some paperwork was being signed on one of the ValuJet
planes.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
40
Ms. Heck, in her opening statement, said that
Mr. Taber would testify that Mr. Gonzalez told him he had to
sign the paperwork without reading it. Of course, Mr. Taber
said no such thing. He merely said that Mr. Gonzalez told
him they need to get the paperwork signed.
He, on cross-examination, testified that signing
the paperwork is part of the usual business of doing work at
SabreTech and that Mr. Gonzalez did not tell him to sign the
paperwork without reading it, and he only considered the
comment about we need you to sign the paperwork as a request
to get the paperwork and the job wrapped up.
I'm not really sure what else to address
factually. I don't know if the Court has any questions that
I could answer. It seems to me almost clear beyond argument
on the face of it that there is insufficient evidence to
prove that Danny Gonzalez participated in any conspiracy of
any kind.
Certainly there is no relationship whatsoever
between the facts presented through the witnesses DiStefano
and Quan with respect to the fight with DiStefano regarding
the Aserca work paper organization and the fight, by the
facts related to the jury, by the mechanics Taber and
Rodriguez with respect to signing of documents in the
ValuJet work booth almost, I guess it was five or six months
later. No nexus whatsoever.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
41
There is simply no evidence of any kind of an
agreement, tacit, expressed or otherwise, to falsify work
cards. There's a complete insufficiency of evidence to show
that an agreement was ever formed between Mr. Gonzalez,
Mr. Florence or anyone else at SabreTech to falsify the
documents.
As I said, initially the allegation that work card
R 45904 was falsified simply has not been proven. Ms. Heck
has not shown that that work was not done. She certainly
recognized that was an essential component of the case in a
statement in opening argument. She predicted that
Mr. DiStefano would state that the work had not been done
prior to the flight.
Not only could he not say that, but as I said
previously, he did not even say that the work card had not
filled our -- had been filled out, nor could Mr. Quan.
The facts regarding the fight, to the extent
Ms. Heck wants to argue they provide any kind of a
circumstantial backdrop in support of the allegation there
was a falsification, are in vivid conflict between the
Government's two witnesses.
Mr. Quan testified that he saw -- overheard the
fight between Mr. DiStefano and Mr. Gonzalez, and that the
import of the fight was over the organization of the
paperwork and that Mr. Gonzalez's final resolution of the
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
42
matter was, I'm in charge here. We are going to put the
paperwork back in the condition that it's usually placed in
and that's how we are going to proceed on this C-Check.
He stated that Mr. Gonzalez left the booth with
paperwork and handed paperwork out to the mechanics to work
on it in the usual way. I believe that was under
examination by the Court that brought that out.
Mr. DiStefano related a different version of
events altogether, stating that he saw Mr. Gonzalez handing
out work over his shoulder to mechanics without even looking
at them. But the most striking divergence in the
testimony -- and I believe the Court has to consider all the
evidence and it has to consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Government, but it cannot ignore and
should not ignore evidence from Government witnesses that is
just completely in conflict, and I would argue,
irreconcilable.
If not that, it creates, under the case law, such
an equivocal nature of proof that any reasonably minded jury
should enter a judgment of acquittal, and I suggest that the
Court should do the same under Rule 29.
On the essential issue of the handling of work
card R 45904 -- and that's the fact that the Government
wants to argue, solely the handling of R 45904 by Danny
Gonzalez that proves that he falsified.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
43
You will recall that Mr. DiStefano said there was
an initial fight, Mr. Quan reiterated the same; that after
that fight, depending on whose testimony you credit,
Mr. Gonzalez either left and routinely handed out cards, or
Mr. DiStefano left and returned and saw Mr. DiStefano in a
different manner handing out cards.
But after that happened, there came a time, an
hour and a half or two hours later, when Mr. Gonzalez
returned to the work booth, and according to Mr. Qaun,
Mr. Gonzalez pulled the work card out of the board and he
signed it and he put it down. And he said, you see, Chris,
we will have this C-Check done before you know it, and he
put it on the work desk. I think he, Mr. Quan, said he put
it in a bin or a box on the work desk.
Mr. Quan identified that card as the bio-bor fuel
card. He identified it sufficiently to place it in
evidence. Upon examination by Ms. Heck, he said he wasn't
real sure on it, but later in examination he said he did
recognize that card and he believed that was in fact the
card. It was admitted into evidence, I think as SabreTech
Exhibit 4.
Mr. DiStefano testified that Mr. Gonzalez returned
to the booth and he had a card in his hand and he identified
that card as the work card charged in Count II and then
overt act A of Count I. He indicated that Mr. Gonzalez put
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
44
it on the table and said, we will get this C-Check done in
no time.
He said he didn't see Mr. Gonzalez sign it.
Mr. Quan said that he couldn't say that any of the work
cards that had been arrayed on the work board there had not
been signed prior to the fight or the argument.
So there is a complete divergence in testimony
from the Government's witnesses, and it came out in direct
and cross-examination, on which work card Danny Gonzalez
handled or put down on the table.
It's also worthwhile noting, I think, that Chris
DiStefano was unable to identify that card when he appeared
in the Grand Jury about a year and a half after the events
he described. They occurred in December, 1995. He first
testified in the Grand Jury in July of 1997, I think. He
not only couldn't identify the card in the Grand Jury, he
couldn't recall what kind of a card it was.
The Court will also recall that he offered an
estimate of time that it would take to complete the work on
R 45904, and part of the predicate the Government laid to
get that opinion testimony in was that he was well familiar
with the card. He knew what it was and had directed people
to complete that task before and had done that task himself.
So this was not something he was unfamiliar with.
The testimony was also that Mr. DiStefano made no
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
45
copy of the card at the time, that he told nobody of this
suspect handling of that document by Mr. DiStefano. And
this is at a time when Mr. DiStefano testified that he made
a copy of a letter written by a William Drechsler because
impliedly he found that suspect on the desk of Mr. Gonzalez.
Some time later Mr. Gonzalez -- or excuse me,
Mr. DiStefano finally identifies that work card.
Mr. Gonzalez, [sic] of course, is the witness who testified
before the Court that he was the only witness who destroyed
evidence in this case. We know it's a key piece of
evidence, the ValuJet turnover log in this case.
Mr. DiStefano is the only witness who has admitted
lying under oath. He lied before the Grand Jury and I
believe it was with respect to an arrest that occurred while
he was in the military.
Now, all of these things taken together, I think,
have to be evaluated by the Court, respectfully suggest
should be evaluated by the Court. And having evaluated
them, I simply can't do better than say that no reasonably
minded jury could possibly return a verdict of guilty on the
charges against Danny Gonzalez in the Indictment.
It's my view that Mr. Gonzalez should never have
been charged to this case in the first place. The Court
doesn't have the background that we have, having reviewed
the Grand Jury transcripts and having worked through this
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
46
case, but -- and I don't know that it's relevant at this
point, but the Government has done the best they could to
marshal facts and to bring together law and pleadings to try
to present a conspiracy to the jury and to the Court in this
case.
We argued to the Court in the beginning of this
case when we filed our pre-trial motions that there was
absolutely no nexus between the events as described by
Mr. DiStefano and Mr. Quan and the events that eventually
came out through the witnesses Taber and Rodriguez with
respect to the signing of work cards in the ValuJet booth.
I think that's been borne out completely in the testimony
here.
How did we get to this point where the Government
has come in with this incredibly attenuated case that
Mr. Gonzalez, through some sort of a dispute over paperwork,
launched or created some sort of a conspiracy or somehow
that is implimatic of a conspiracy?
Well, because the Government, I think, in a
preordained fashion, went through every record in SabreTech,
talked to a million witnesses, and finally -- in a way I'm
rephrasing my opening statement -- finally came up with
Aserca and, you know, was determined to argue that it was
linked up to the facts such as they were that they had
involving Danny Gonzalez and the signing of documents on
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
47
ValuJet flight 802, or rather, aircraft 802.
The Government has stated that pressure is not a
crime, but wanting to have it both ways, they recently
argued in connection with the admission of a document that
pressure is all about a crime. The evidence that they
offered about pressure was, frankly, merely that it was time
to close out the work on ValuJet 802. The mechanics were
summoned to sign paperwork.
The Government predicted, as I said before, in its
opening that Mr. Taber would say that Danny Gonzalez told
him, no, you can't leave the work booth. We don't have time
for you to read these work orders, you have to sign them
out. That, so far as I'm aware, was never the testimony of
John Taber at any time, whether in the Grand Jury or
debriefings, and it certainly was not the testimony of John
Taber here.
I think the cross-examination of John Taber really
kind of establishes a leitmotif in this case and the
pressure as he saw it was to get the job done, was to do the
paperwork, which was simply an integral part of the work
doing heavy aircraft maintenance at SabreTech; that he was
not told, you can't read this before you sign it. He was
never asked to sign something that wasn't true.
He never felt that the pressure that he was under
was any different than any other pressure that anybody else
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
48
was under there, and that was to do the job and do it right,
but to do it in a timely fashion.
At any point, you know, I would invite inquiry by
the Court if there's anything that I could help to fill in
or to answer the Court's concern at this point. If not, I
would suggest that it might be economical to let
Mr. Moscowitz get up and cover much of the same ground for
the corporation, or we can let Ms. Hack respond to either
one of our arguments. Ms. Moscowitz.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Dunlap.
MR. DUNLAP: I haven't addressed the
jurisdictional issue, but I thought we could do that, with
the Court's permission, after we address the --
THE COURT: I'm going to hear all of your
argument at one time so it can be answered at one time, any
way you want to divide up your argument, and take whatever
time you need. But let me hear everything that you have at
one time.
MR. DUNLAP: The final point I would make, Your
Honor, is with respect to the allegations raised on work
card R 45904, that that is not a matter within the
jurisdiction of the FAA.
Ms. Heck has provided the Court with a memorandum
on jurisdiction and she has tried to address this matter or
anticipate it in a number of fashions. First by a request
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
49
for judicial notice, which really, I think, had a lot of
surplusage in it that essentially tried to get the Courts
to adopt her interpretation of the statute.
Then she was going to put on Mr. Hoke Weiss, a
witness who was going to testify, I anticipate, that the
FAA looks at all records in a repair station, thereby boot
strapping or trying to, through opinion testimony, bolster
her view of what the jurisdiction is.
In fact, the jurisdiction of the FAA is clearly
defined by statute, by the CFR. The FAA has jurisdiction
because of the Chicago convention requiring the
registration of the aircraft to each country. It's clear,
and I believe Ms. Heck will stipulate, that the Venezuelan
aircraft on work card R 45904, which was Aserca Airlines
aircraft widebeam 720-C, was a foreign registry aircraft
and not registered by the FAA.
Not withstanding that, Ms. Heck has argued that
all the repair records at Aserca, any of them, whether they
are for a foreign carrier or domestic carrier, come within
the supervision of the FAA or come within their
jurisdiction. Essentially, Ms. Heck is really trying to
turn the regulatory scheme on its head.
The registration -- or the certification of
repair stations, if the Court reads our response, came into
being to certify and monitor the operation of these repair
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
50
stations with respect to aircraft described within this
part, as referred to in our brief. "This part" means the
section of the FAA that describes the aircraft over which
they have jurisdiction, which are U.S. aircraft.
Ms. Heck is essentially saying, prove we don't
have jurisdiction. In effect, it's really her obligation
to prove that they do have jurisdiction. The jurisdiction,
again, flows strictly from the FAA's primary jurisdiction,
which is over the aircraft.
As a corollary of that, the FAA has granted
licenses to domestic repair stations and in some cases to
foreign repair stations, but solely for the purpose of
working on U.S. aircraft. Ms. Heck has cited a couple of
other sections which I will deal with if the Court thinks
it's necessary in an attempt to try to save the issue and
establish jurisdiction, but they are inapposite.
She, for example, suggested to the Court in her
pleading that because the Aserca aircraft had come up here
to be worked on, that that makes it qualified as an
aircraft involved in foreign air commerce. If the Court
reads on Page 18 of our submission the CFR describing what
foreign air commerce means, it means transportation of
property, passengers by aircraft for compensation.
In fact, and the Court can refer back to the
testimony of the tech rep, Drechsler, that aircraft came up
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
51
here for no commercial purpose. It was ferried up here
under a ferry permit for the specific purpose of being
maintained. That aircraft came up here and the air station
itself, Aserca, had to be approved by the Venezuelan FAA,
so that the conduct of the repair on that aircraft was
within the jurisdiction of the Venezuelan FAA.
You'll recall that Mr. Drechsler said that the
counterparts of our FAA in Venezuela had come up, we even
had to pay for their airline tickets to come up and for
their lodging and boarding to look at the station and
approve their station.
THE COURT: Were the work cards required to be
filed with the Venezuelan Air Force?
MR. DUNLAP: Yes, they were. That was part of
the testimony of Mr. Drechsler, that a complete set of work
cards had to be sent back to Venezuela. He was asked, did
you release the aircraft to service? He said, I signed a
release form, but I don't have the authority to put that
aircraft back in service. The Venezuelan FAA had to
inspect it themselves and determine whether the airplane
was back in service.
I believe part of the testimony was there was
some part of the work package that had to be finalized and
he had to get them sent back to Venezuela so they could be
duly executed and that their counterpart could issue their
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
52
authorization for the plane to return to service.
THE COURT: There was no requirement that they be
filed with the American FAA?
MR. DUNLAP: No, there was not, Your Honor, none
whatsoever. Ms. Heck has cited a few things that I think
may be worthy of mentioning. She cited some general
requirements for repair stations to maintain records, but
that section, 145.23, requires that they are maintained for
determining compliance with this part. That means the
section of the FAA that defines what aircraft are within
their jurisdiction.
Those are U.S. registered aircraft and foreign
registered aircraft that are operated by U.S. carriers.
I'm confident Ms. Heck will stipulate that the Aserca
aircraft satisfied neither one of those classifications.
On that point, Ms. Heck has cited U.S. v. Rogers
and, of course, there is some dicta that she is citing
there. But the specific holding in Rogers, 466 U.S. 476,
is the department or agency has jurisdiction when it has
the power to exercise authority in a particular situation.
Sometimes these things that we have to prove,
like I said, it is like proving a negative. Prove that
there's not jurisdiction. There is no reported instance
either in Federal case law or administrative actions where
the FAA has ever taken or attempted to take action in a
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
53
matter where a U.S. maintenance facility has performed
maintenance on a non U.S. plane, simply because they
wouldn't. They don't have jurisdiction over it. It's not
within their jurisdiction.
The FAA similarly -- as I said, to try to address
this thing by reversal, by saying, well, since the FAA has
created these repair stations, therefore, we can turn the
syllogism around and say, they have the certified repair
stations, therefore they have authority over everything
they do, is simply not the case.
The FAA certified repair station is solely to be
able to work on FAA registered planes and for no other
purpose.
That is the complete argument I have to present to
the Court at this time. Again, if the Court has any
questions, I'm available to answer them.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Mr. Moscowitz.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
I'm presenting a motion under Rule 29 for
judgment of acquittal on behalf of the corporation. Some
of the things I have to say, Your Honor, relate to matters
covered by Mr. Dunlap and I'll try not to be repetitive.
Your Honor, this Indictment alleges that the
corporation and its employees, these defendants committed
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
54
crimes substantial enough to cause this air tragedy and the
death of 110 people. Having now heard the Government's --
all the Government's evidence, the Government's evidence
proves what was really never in dispute, that this tragedy
took place.
They presented some evidence that the crash was
caused by the oxygen generators, although that evidence is
in dispute, so it's not for argument here. But they have
presented no evidence, Your Honor, showing that these
defendants committed any crimes which led to the placing of
those generators on that aircraft.
There is a complete lack of evidence showing any
willfulness, any bad faith, any criminal intent on behalf of
anybody working at SabreTech in connection with those
generators.
Now, they have put on evidence, and it's largely
not in dispute, as to the events, the facts which led to
those oxygen generators being placed on that aircraft, and
we really don't dispute the evidence showing that chain or
that sequence of events.
What that evidence shows, Your Honor, is not a
series of crimes, but it shows a series of missteps and at a
critical point, a lack of coordination, a lack of
communication, which led to the generators being placed on
that aircraft.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
55
This is simply a case -- this evidence shows
beyond any reasonable doubt that this tragedy, if it was
caused by the generators, was a result of mistake, error,
lack of purpose, lack of intent, and not, as alleged in the
Indictment, as a result of criminal intent, willfulness and
intentional conduct.
Your Honor, I will address the evidence with
regard to each count separately, briefly, and we are seeking
judgment of acquittal on each count.
Let me just say a few things generally about what
the undisputed evidence will show. We will put aside for a
minute, Your Honor, the evidence relating to Mr. Gonzalez
and Aserca Airlines, which is a separate matter.
With regard to the conduct of these defendants,
SabreTech and its employees relating to the oxygen
generators, all the evidence without dispute shows from the
very beginning the mechanics who worked on the generators
were working and operating in absolute good faith, seeking
to perform their jobs and doing what they believed they were
suppose to do.
Where the problem with the generators began was
with an effort to properly service the three ValuJet
aircraft that they were working on. Your Honor will recall
the testimony that the generators only became an issue when
the mechanics, Mr. DiStefano among them, Mr. Taber and the
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
56
others, checked the aircraft and found out that the
generators on those aircraft that had come in from ValuJet
were out of date; that they only had a useful life of no
longer than 12 years and a number of these were beyond that
date.
So, quite properly, to ensure that there were
properly functioning generators on those aircraft, they took
steps to replace them, to take those generators off. The
undisputed testimony was that in every step in handling
those generators they did the best they could to handle them
safely and responsibly.
They removed them carefully. When they removed
them they did not have the caps. These defendants, the
mechanics, Mr. Florence, Mr. Taber and others, notified
their superiors that they didn't have caps. To ensure that
they were safe they went to great pains to carefully, as
Your Honor heard, wrap the lanyard around the firing pins,
around the generators, to ensure that they could not
accidentally discharge.
As you heard, that work took hours and hours. It
took several days of work by a compliment of these mechanics
doing that. They put the generators aside and continued
with their work as they were supposed to do.
With regard to disposal of these generators, Your
Honor, first, the only testimony that the Court heard, that
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
57
the jury heard with regard to what these mechanics believed
they were doing, intended they were doing, they were focused
on properly completing the maintenance work on these
aircraft to make sure that when they returned to service
they were air worthy. And they were quite properly
concerned with the performance of the duties and the safety
of these aircraft.
As far as these mechanics knew, and this is
undisputed testimony, they believe, Mr. Valenzuela,
Mr. Florence, all the others, that these generators removed
from the aircraft were out of date, would not be used again,
would simply be disposed of as garbage, not that they were
going to be put on another aircraft and transported back to
Atlanta.
What they believed and what Mr. Taber testified to
was that these generators would be disposed of as garbage by
ValuJet, and that simply is the undisputed testimony with
regard to the mechanics' state of mind, their intent and
good faith.
Now, I would like to first address, Your Honor,
Count II, which is the false statement count relating to
Mr. Gonzalez and Aserca Airlines.
As the Court heard, all the evidence related to
Aserca Airlines, has nothing to do with ValuJet aircraft
that would be worked on at SabreTech. It has nothing to do
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
58
with the oxygen generators that wound up on that flight on
May 10th. It has nothing to do with oxygen generators at
all.
It's a totally separate incident, a totally
separate piece of work being done at SabreTech prior to the
work being done, in fact, on these generators. Your Honor
will recall that the work on this aircraft was in December,
1995. The ValuJet aircraft work really began in January,
1996.
With regard to the false statement alleged in this
Count II against Mr. Gonzalez alone -- and only Mr. Gonzalez
is charged with this false statement. And it's worth
noting, and I will get back to this, that there's not even
any other alleged co-conspirators who are alleged to have
been involved with Mr. Gonzalez in this false statement.
For a brief period of time the Government alleged
that Mr. DiStefano was a co-conspirator with Mr. Gonzalez
regarding that false statement, but then they withdrew that
allegation. So it is Mr. Gonzalez by himself.
The false statement is alleged to be on Government
Exhibit 4, which is the work card relating to the deicer
system. The Government alleges that Mr. Gonzalez falsified
that document, claiming that he had done the work when, in
fact, the work wasn't done.
As Mr. Dunlap points out, the only evidence, the
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
59
only testimony that that is the document which is in
question comes from Mr. DiStefano.
The Government presented another witness,
Mr. Quan, who testifies that it was a different document
which was at issue on that date. The problem with the
Government's evidence, Your Honor, starts right there, that
taking their evidence as true -- and we can't choose between
Mr. DiStefano and Mr. Quan, they are both Government
witnesses -- there's a hopeless contradiction between the
Government's only two witnesses on this false statement as
to what the document is, even before you get to whether it's
false, as to what the document is.
Mr. DiStefano testified that he saw Mr. Gonzalez
sign or present the deicer card. Mr. Quan testified that he
saw Mr. Gonzalez present -- that the document in question is
this bio-bor card, which is a different card for a different
function altogether.
Now, both Mr. Quan and Mr. DiStefano were present
with Mr. Gonzalez at the same time. They are clearly
talking about the same incident. It was a small room.
While Mr. DiStefano appears to be the more aggrieved of the
two, Mr. Quan had equal opportunity to view whatever
document Mr. Gonzalez is alleged to have signed and
presented, and there is simply no way to reconcile the two.
Mr. DiStefano's testimony, he acknowledged that in
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
60
the Grand Jury, where he testified two years ago, he
couldn't say what the card was. He, at that point, had no
recollection that it was a deicer card. It was only until
several weeks before this trial -- it goes back to May,
several months, that he first identified the card that he
alleges Mr. Gonzalez falsified as this deicer card,
Government Exhibit No. 4, over three years after the
incident.
Mr. Quan identified here in court, and he was
consistent throughout, that it was the bio-bor card. Now,
if it was the bio-bor card, Your Honor -- the bio-bor is an
additive that is supposed to be put into the fuel to prevent
algae and fungus from growing. Mr. Quan testified that the
bio-bor card --
THE COURT: How do you spell it?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: B-i-o dash b-o-r.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: He identifies that card,
SabreTech Exhibit No. 4, that's a card signed by
Mr. Gonzalez and filled out by Mr. Gonzalez, as essentially
not applicable to work not done; that when Mr. Gonzalez, as
Mr. Quan explained, when Mr. Gonzalez executed that card,
he is saying that we are not doing this work.
That clearly is not alleged and cannot be alleged
by the Government as a false statement. Their theory of
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
61
false statements is that Mr. Gonzalez was claiming work was
done when it wasn't done. The card that Mr. Quan has
Mr. Gonzalez executing is a card where he says that the
work is not done.
When the Government's own evidence as to what the
document is --
THE COURT: What did DiStefano say that he saw
Gonzalez sign, the deicer card?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes. DiStefano claimed, now, now
in court, that the card that Gonzalez had signed and
executed was the deicer card.
THE COURT: Which is Government Exhibit 4?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now then, Mr. Quan said, "I saw him
sign the bio-bor card." Is that card in evidence?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, that's SabreTech Exhibit No.
4 or 2. I don't recall which it is.
THE COURT: All right. You are saying that
Mr. Qaun's identification, if it is believed by the jury,
would not be a false statement because he said we didn't do
any work?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: That's right.
THE COURT: If the jury believes Mr. DiStefano,
then they would believe that Mr. Gonzalez signed off on
work on the deicer which, in fact, he said he did and he
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
62
didn't do, if that's to be believed.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Right.
THE COURT: Is that it?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Right.
THE COURT: Now, can we look at Count II and see
what he is charged with?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. The Indictment
in Count II charges Mr. Gonzalez -- this is on the bottom
of Page 7, top of Page 8.
THE COURT: Skip all the other language. Get to
the false statement.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: At the top of Page 8, that he
executed and signed his mechanic's work card R 45904 for
Aserca Airlines. And that is the deicer card.
THE COURT: That's the deicer card?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes.
THE COURT: So that's Count II and that charges
him with the deicer. So what the Government must prove
under Count II, if I understand your submission correctly,
is that Mr. Gonzalez signed R 45904, the deicer card. And
they have testimony, as I understand it, from Mr. DiStefano
who said, I saw him sign that card saying that he had done
the work, and then there's other proof somewhere in this
record that, in fact, he did not do that work. No?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Let me clarify, Your Honor.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
63
Mr. DiStefano alleges that Mr. Gonzalez came back into the
booth with that card already signed and executed.
MR. DUNLAP: May I address the factual issue?
Just on this narrow point, Your Honor, Mr. DiStefano
specifically said he did not see Mr. Gonzalez sign the
card. Mr. DiStefano did not testify that the card was
unsigned before the fight.
Mr. Quan, who was also in charge of the work
booth, testified that he could not state that any of the
cards there, including the deicer card, had not been signed
prior to the fight.
THE COURT: I understand. But Government Exhibit
4, the deicer card, was and is admitted into evidence in
this record.
MR. DUNLAP: Yes, it is.
THE COURT: And it does contain, or purportedly
contains, with witnesses who have identified it, the
signature of Mr. Gonzalez. So that's in evidence and at
this point, of course, we must take the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government.
So, if the jury believes -- well, if they look at
the card and believe that that's Mr. Gonzalez's signature
on card 45904, the deicer card, then is it not a
proposition of argument to the jury by credibility and
weight to be given to that testimony as contrasted with
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
64
sufficiency of the proof to go to the jury? That's really
my question.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Our position, Your Honor, is,
taking all of the Government's evidence, not choosing to
credit some evidence and credit others, you also have the
testimony of Mr. Quan that the document that was presented
signed by Mr. Gonzalez on that date was a different
document.
THE COURT: Yes, but that, it seems to me, is
what the jury is paid these exorbitant fees to do, $20.00 a
day, or whatever these good citizens get, and that's to
sort out the facts and the conflict in testimony. It's not
something that I can pick and choose unless the totality of
the evidence is so inherently improbable as to be not
worthy of belief at all.
So the question is whether or not DiStefano's
testimony that the card was signed -- I don't know whether
Mr. DiStefano said he could identify or did identify
Mr. Gonzalez's signature or not, but the document was
admitted into evidence so somebody would have had to
identify it, I presume.
So, with that being in evidence, that, then,
seems to me probably is a matter of whatever weight they
want to give to DiStefano. You argue that another witness
said something else, identified a different card, and the
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
65
jury may reject DiStefano's testimony. But that's the
function of the jury at this point, is it not, as
contrasted with the Court?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: I think the Court's function at
this point is to say, without choosing to credit some other
evidence presented by the Government, can a jury
reasonably, on the basis of this evidence, find beyond a
reasonable doubt that this is a document which is
falsified?
This is not the same case where the Government
presents DiStefano on its case and DiStefano testifies it's
the deicer card, and in the defense case we put on Quan and
Quan says, "no, no, it was the bio-bor card." Then you
have two witnesses in conflict and it is the jury's
function at that point to decide whether to believe the
Government's witness or to believe the defense witness.
Here you've got the Government's own two
witnesses hopelessly in conflict as to what the document
is. On the state of that record, I think it is the Court's
function, under Rule 29 motion, to say this evidence is
hopelessly in conflict as presented to the jury and the
jury couldn't reasonably conclude, where you've got two
Government witnesses saying two different cards, that this
is even the card that Gonzalez presented and signed on that
date.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
66
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: The second thing, Your Honor,
goes to the question of evidence as to whether -- assuming
for a second that DiStefano is correct, that it was the
deicer card, the basis for the Government's argument that
there's a false entry is simply this, that DiStefano
testified that there was approximately a 90-minute period
of time between when Mr. Gonzalez was removing the card and
then came back in with the card signed, and there was no
way in that 90-minute period of time that Gonzalez could
have done the work on that aircraft.
So the inference is, if that's the only period of
time in which he could have done the work, therefore, it's
a false entry.
As Mr. Dunlap pointed out, in fact, that's not
really what DiStefano's testimony was. On
cross-examination, DiStefano acknowledged that before the
aircraft was in the hangar where it was, it would have been
outside at an earlier station, what is called the pre-dock,
during which various checks and operation checks are made.
It's on the pre-dock that tests or operation
checks like this deicer check are properly done. And,
indeed, Mr. Drechsler testified that it's preferable that
this kind of test be done during the pre-dock stage.
So, by DiStefano's own acknowledgment and also by
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
67
Drechsler's testimony, the inference which the Government
seeks to draw, that it only could have been done during that
90-minute period isn't supported by the evidence on the
record; that acknowledged by DiStefano and acknowledged by
Drechsler that during the pre-dock stage, which is prior to
this day, a whole bunch of the operation tests like this
would have been done.
So, the Government's argument as to why this has
to be false isn't supported by the testimony of their own
two witnesses, that it only could have been done during this
90-minute period of time.
The Government also presented, Your Honor,
Mr. Drechsler, who is the tech rep for Aserca, to support
the allegations that there had been false documents
submitted by SabreTech on the Aserca aircraft, but
Mr. Drechsler, when he testified, testified, in fact, to the
contrary.
He acknowledged that, in fact, he did not believe
that documents had been presented falsely for work that had
not been done. To the contrary, Drechsler acknowledged that
it was his understanding and belief that all the work had
properly been done on this aircraft. So Drechsler, as well,
contradicts any inference that there was a false statement
on this card.
With regard to the jurisdiction issue -- that
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
68
goes, Your Honor, to two facts; one, we believe the evidence
is hopelessly in conflict on what the document is; two,
there is no evidence at this point which supports the
inference that the statement is false by DiStefano's own
acknowledgement that this test could have been done on an
earlier date.
The third issue, Your Honor, is, of course,
jurisdiction, whether this document, this work card, is even
within the jurisdiction of the FAA.
Now, I know the Government submitted a brief,
Mr. Dunlap has submitted a very fine brief. I think the
issue is actually fairly simple and is not as large as it
may appear from the pleadings.
The issue isn't generally the FAA's jurisdiction
over aircraft coming into the United States. There may be a
whole variety of grounds upon which the FAA can exercise and
does exercise that jurisdiction. The only issue is
jurisdiction over this particular work card, this
maintenance record of maintenance work done on this Aserca
Airlines aircraft.
Now, with regard to jurisdiction over maintenance
records, we start at the same place where, I think, the
Government starts, which is Part 145 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, which relates to the records of the work
performed at domestic repair stations, and SabreTech was a
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
69
repair station.
Now, the Government points out Part 145.23 does
say that each certified repair station shall allow the
administrator, the FAA, to inspect it at any time to
determine its compliance with its card and this inspection
will cover the adequacy of the repair station's records. So
it does say that generally.
Now, the question then becomes, what records are
being referred to? If you go further in Part 145 relating
to repair stations, Part 145.57 explains that the repair
station performs its maintenance work on aircraft in
accordance with the standards of Part 43 of this chapter.
So, in terms of knowing the standards under which
the repair station operates you have to look to Part 43,
which the Government does not cite to. Part 43, Your Honor,
is the portion of the CFR relating to aircraft maintenance
in the FAA, which defines -- Part 43 defines what records
regarding maintenance of aircraft are within the purview of
the FAA.
Part 43, its title is maintenance, preventive
maintenance, rebuilding and alteration. Part 43 sets out
what records -- the records of which the FAA asserts it has
jurisdiction, particularly, what maintenance records it
asserts it has jurisdiction. There may be other records
that it has jurisdiction relating to aircraft on other
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
70
grounds, but this is talking about maintenance records, at
least one document of maintenance records is defined by Part
43.
Part 43.1, the applicability section, says that,
in effect, the only records -- the maintenance records over
which the FAA exercises jurisdiction are the records of an
aircraft having a U.S. airworthiness certificate, which
means a U.S. registered aircraft, or, if we are talking
about a foreign registry aircraft, that only a foreign
registered aircraft which is in common carriage of the mail
be, under the provisions of Part 121, 127, 135, which say a
foreign registered aircraft being operated by a United
States airline.
So the maintenance records which are covered by
Part 43 are just that, either a U.S. registered aircraft or
a foreign aircraft if it's being operated by a U.S.
airlines. Indeed, Your Honor, it's interesting the same
Part 43 has its own provision regarding falsification of
records regarding -- 43.12, regarding the duty to make only
correct statements in maintenance records.
Those maintenance records, again, are only those
of a U.S. registered aircraft or foreign aircraft being
operated by a U.S. carrier. Now, I really think those are
the only CFRs which I think are relevant here.
Now, the facts are in this case, as testified to
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71
by Mr. Drechsler, who was the tech rep of Aserca, that
Aserca is a Venezuelan airline and it was operating only
passenger service in Venezuela. It doesn't operate,
according to his testimony, in the United States. And that
this aircraft, 720-C, is a Venezuelan registered aircraft.
United States aircraft, Your Honor, start with a
registration number of N. The Aserca aircraft was --
MR. DUNLAP: YV.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: -- YV. So the aircraft itself is
not a U.S. certified aircraft and belongs to an airline
which is not a United States airline. Therefore, under
Part 43, the maintenance records are not within the purview
of that statute. So, as a matter of law -- we agree with
the issue of law as to what the jurisdiction is as to the
FAA of what records, and applying that law to this case,
this is not a maintenance record which comes within the
scope of that jurisdiction.
I want to skip, Your Honor, to -- that's all I
have with regard to Count II.
THE COURT: Well, it's 12:11 and we have that
jury coming at 1:00, contrary to counsels' belief that we
could handle all these arguments in 30 minutes, which the
Court didn't really think that it could. that's why I
asked you to come in at 9:00 to start.
It looks like we will have to excuse this jury
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
72
and send them home. We will have the rest of the afternoon
for these arguments. We have only gotten up to Count II on
two defendants. We haven't even heard from the Government.
I see no point in trying to finish the argument in the next
45 minutes.
I suppose we could break off, if this isn't too
disruptive of argument, and let the jury listen to the
little bit of evidence we have for the Government and then
rest and then send them home. Maybe that would be a better
plan, rather than to leave the impression with them that we
wasted their day.
Do any of you have -- my suggestion would be that
we cover the balance of the Government's case, take ten
minutes, I guess, and then excuse them for the day. Then
we'll go on with these arguments. Is that agreeable?
MS. MILLER: That's fine, Your Honor. It will be
ten minutes or less. It's just putting the documents in
evidence and reading the stipulations.
THE COURT: I understand. We will recess at this
time and resume at 1:00 briefly for the conclusion of the
Government's case before the jury.
Apparently we are resuming at 1:30 with the jury.
What area were you about to get into now?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Count I. Actually, Your Honor, I
was going to discuss the evidence with regard to
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
73
Mr. Valenzuela.
THE COURT: He is not on trial here today.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: He is not, but SabreTech is
charged with his misconduct in Counts III and IV.
THE COURT: But they didn't offer any evidence,
did they, regarding what he did?
MS. MILLER: Yes, we did, Your Honor. The work
cards that he signed are in evidence and we also have the
testimony of Thomas Silvers about Mauro Valenzuela's
actions.
THE COURT: Well, this seems to me to be a
reasonable place to break. So it will be 1:30 we will
resume with the jury, then we will resume with the
arguments at whatever time they are at. We will be in
recess until 1:30.
COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
[There was a luncheon recess].
AFTERNOON SESSION
2:00 P.M.
COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. Court is now in
session. The Honorable James Lawrence King presiding.
THE COURT: Thank you. I'm advised the rest of
the jury is all here now. Are we ready to bring them in
and announce that --
MS. MILLER: Yes, Judge. I'm going to be reading
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
74
stipulations, and one that I don't have is the on yellow
paper that I think Ms. Kramerman had.
THE COURT: I thought you made copies and give
them to everyone.
COURTROOM DEPUTY: No. She said she didn't need
copies.
MS. MILLER: I have copies of the others, but I
don't have a copy of that one.
THE COURT: You went out of here and made copies,
and brought them back. Here, you can take mine.
MS. MILLER: I have copies of the others, Your
Honor.
COURTROOM DEPUTY: You have made copies of that,
too?
MS. MILLER: No.
COURTROOM DEPUTY: Oh, okay.
THE COURT: All right. Let's bring in the jury
and get started. Then we will excuse them until 9:00
tomorrow morning. Is that all right? Well, we have got
all night. I guess we will finish.
[The jury returns to the courtroom].
THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated, please.
All right, Ms. Miller.
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, at this time, the
government would move various documents and items into
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
75
evidence.
The government moves into evidence exhibit 40,
SabreTech repair station inspection procedures manual.
THE COURT: Without objection, admitted into
evidence.
[Government Exhibit 40 received in evidence].
MS. MILLER: The government moves into evidence
40 A, and in connection therewith would be the stipulation.
The parties stipulate and agree that Government Exhibit 40
A is excerpted from SabreTech's operations standard
operating manual in effect as of July 27, 1995 through May
11, 1996.
THE COURT: Admitted into evidence without
objection.
Ladies and gentlemen, we have covered a lot of
these things in the morning, and the lawyers have
objections, one or two, but mostly do not. The stipulation
is, as I've told you before, agreement between the parties
to stipulate to a fact that doesn't require any further
evidence. You may accept the stipulation is a fact without
the necessity of calling a witness to prove that particular
fact. All right.
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, I would next like to
more into evidence, a group of documents. Exhibit 66,
certificate of incorporation of SabreTech, Inc. Exhibit 67
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
76
A, certificate of incorporation of SabreLiner Corporation.
67B, certificate of amendment of SabreLiner Corporation.
Exhibit 68, black binder containing documents relating to
sale of DynAir stock to SabreLiner. Exhibit 69,
certificate of ownership, merger and articles of merger,
merging DynAir companies into SabreTech. Exhibit 70,
certificate of merger of DynAir Tech companies into
SabreTech, including certified copies of Exhibits 68B and
68C.
THE COURT: All right. Each of those documents
are admitted into evidence.
[Government Exhibits 66, 67A, 67B, 68, 69, 70 received in
evidence].
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, the government next
would offer into evidence three exhibits: Exhibit 82,
airman file for Danny Gonzalez, Exhibit 83, airman file for
Eugene Florence, and Exhibit 84, airman file for Mauro
Valenzuela. In connection with those exhibits, I would
like to read a stipulation.
"The parties hereby stipulate that from July 1,
1995, to and including May 11, 1996: one, Daniel
Gonzalez was a holder of an airplane and power plant
certificate; two, Eugene Florence was a holder of an
airplane and power plant certificate; and three, Mauro
Valenzuela was a holder of an airplane and power plant
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
77
certificate."
THE COURT: Those documents are admitted into
evidence.
[Government Exhibits 82, 83 and 84 received in evidence].
MS. MILLER: The government offers into evidence
exhibit 95, memorandum dated May 1, 1996 from Steve Towns
of SabreTech to David Gentry of ValuJet.
THE COURT: What number is on that?
MS. MILLER: 95.
THE COURT: This document is admitted into
evidence with the following instruction: The document may
only be considered by the jury in deciding the case and the
issues presented in the case of United States v. SabreTech.
It may not be considered in considering the case and
whether or not the government has met it's burden of
proving the case beyond and to the exclusion of all
reasonable doubt as it pertains to the two individual
defendants.
In other words, in this particular letter, when
you're talking about this, you may only consider it with
reference to one defendant, that is, SabreTech, and not as
to the two individual defendants, Florence and Gonzalez.
All right. Has 29 been offered yet?
MS. MILLER: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
Government offers Exhibit 29, model of PSU.
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THE COURT: What we are referring to here, that
item is admitted into evidence. It is, it's a brown, it's
in a brown box here right in front of you. Perhaps
somebody could hold it up for the jury or something.
You have seen this exhibit before. You will
recall that the evidence establishes that I believe
McDonald Douglas prepared this, sent it to the government
for introductions at trial. It is not anything that is
recovered from the crash site. It is not anything that has
been put into an airplane. It is merely an example of the
type of oxygen container, masks, lanyards, tubes, et
cetera, that we have been talking about in this case.
You will note this one, I believe, has four
oxygen masks. So, do not confuse it with any actual item
in this case. It is simply an example of what the
mechanics were working on when they put these units in the
compartment that you heard described. For that purpose,
you may consider it. All right.
MS. MILLER: The government offers into evidence
exhibit 96, copy of SabreTech repair station certificate.
THE COURT: 96 admitted into evidence.
[Government Exhibit 96 received in evidence].
MS. MILLER: And finally, Your Honor, the
government wishes to read two stipulations. May I, Your
Honor?
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
79
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. MILLER: "The United States and the
defendants, SabreTech, Inc., Daniel Gonzalez and Eugene
Florence hereby stipulate to the following: One, one
kilogram is equivalent to approximately 2.2 pounds.
Two, in the centigrade scale, zero degrees represents
freezing point, and 100 degrees represents boiling
point".
And, Your Honor, also stipulation:
"The United States and the defendants, SabreTech,
Inc., Daniel Gonzalez and Eugene Florence have agreed
to stipulate to the following facts. The ValuJet
aircraft and 904 VJ departed Miami International
Airport as ValuJet flight 592, and that aircraft
crashed approximately 11 minutes later, resulting in
the death of all 110 persons on board.
THE COURT: All right. Next?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, that completes our
presentation. The government rests its case.
THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, in
spite of our best planning and in an attempt not to have
you come down and not have something for you to do, and as
I say, in spite of our best planning, it just didn't work
out. So, this is all we can do with the jury today.
We have been in court in the case, considering
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
80
other facts this morning that you're not involved in, legal
matters, and we have other matters to consider this
afternoon.
At this point in time, we are going to excuse you
to come back tomorrow morning. Please remember -- at 9:00
tomorrow morning. Please remember the instruction not to
watch anything on television, listen to anything on the
radio, or read anything in the newspapers if anything there
should be.
Again, I instruct you, do not have any contact
with anybody connected with this case, the agents, the
defendants, the lawyers, the witnesses or anybody. Please
don't have conversations as you go up and down the hall
regarding anything to do with the case for the simple
reason innocently someone might overhear you and create
problems.
In the jury room, please don't commence your
discussions yet about the case. The government has rested
the case, and we -- the case is moving along very well. It
is not going to take as long as we had originally told you.
Indeed, it may well be that the case will be completed by
the end of the week. I tell you this, so you can make
plans for yourself, and do a little planning in terms of
your own lives not connected with the case.
We thank you for your patience and attendance, and
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
81
we will see you tomorrow morning at 9:00. We will proceed
promptly as directed. Please be here at 9:00. Thank you
very much.
[The jury leaves the courtroom].
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. We will now
resume with Mr. Moscowitz on further submission of the
motions in connection with reassertion of all motions
previously made, and motions for Rule 29, directed verdict
of acquittal. Mr. Moscowitz.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. I just
want to finish up briefly on Count II, which is the de-icer
card related to Mr. Gonzalez. I've gone over the
transcript in the break, and just briefly, I want to be
very clear about this.
With regard to the issue of whether that card is
false as required to be proven, there is no evidence,
direct or circumstantial, in this record, which shows that
Mr. Gonzalez did not do that work, and that the card is
false. Now with regard to direct evidence, Mr. DiStefano
did not testify that Mr. Gonzalez did not do that work. No
one else testified that Mr. Gonzalez did not do that work.
With regard to Mr. DiStefano --
THE COURT: Yes, but let's talk about what the
evidence does show. Because we can go all day talking
about what it does not. What it does show and we all
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
82
understand this, is that DiStefano said that he saw the
card go out at a certain time, no?
Somebody said, somebody testified that the card
went out with Mr. Gonzalez or someone. Mr. Gonzalez took
the card out, I guess that's what it was. Came back 90
minutes later; something about a 90 minute gap. I don't
know who said that they saw him taking it out, and he put
it under his arm, which is a customary place to carry it,
nothing wrong with that, and he handed it out to different
people. Came back 90 minutes later. The work could not
have been performed in that 90 minutes. Now then, those
are the facts, I believe, in this case.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, respectfully, I was
confused. I went back with the transcript. That's not
what DiStefano testified to.
THE COURT: All right. Tell me what he said.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: DiStefano testified that there
was a fight. Gonzalez left. He doesn't say that he saw
Gonzalez take that card with him. What he says is, 90
minutes later, Gonzalez comes back in with that de-icer
card filled out and signed. What he says is "--
THE COURT: Was there any testimony that it was
blank when it went out of there?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: He didn't saw it leaving. What
he said was --
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
83
THE COURT: Any other witness testify that the
cards were kept in the control booth, they went out and
were given to the people, and then they were returned every
day? Isn't that the testimony?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, with regard to this card,
excuse me, with regard to this card, Ms. Heck asked him,
"had you seen that work card previously?" This is before
he brings it in. He said, "Yes, I have." "When had you
previously seen that card." Answer: "There was a period
when I went out to smoke a cigarette." Da, da, da, da. "I
went to the hallway where the restrooms are. Then Danny's
office was right on the corner in the hallway, and has a
window right there, that you can see his desk from the
hangar deck, and I saw that item sitting on the desk."
So, that's the first time he says he sees the
card. That not a card that he says, Danny Gonzalez took
out 90 minutes before. He said, the first time he sees it,
it's on Danny's desk. And then Danny brings it inside.
He does not say, he does not say that -- I mean,
what he says, he didn't do the work in that 90 minutes
because he sees the card sitting there. He doesn't say
that's the only time he could have done that. If he'd said
that, the inference could have been drawn that he's
testifying that the work was not done.
THE COURT: Okay.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
84
MR. MOSCOWITZ: I'm sorry, Your Honor. In fact,
what he does say, to Mr. Dunlap is Mr. Dunlap asked him,
page 73:
"Question: When an aircraft arrives in the
facility or SabreTech, the first thing that's done is
an induction on the plane, correct?
Answer: I don't know what you mean by an
induction.
Question: An engine run up. They run the engines
up.
Answer by DiStefano: You try to do as many op
checks as you can.
Question: That's before the plane comes in the
hangar?
Answer: Yes.
Question: The events you describe in the hangar,
this is during the argument, where you had a
confrontation disagreement with Danny, the Aserca
aircraft 705 was in the hangar at that point?
Answer: Aircraft 705?
Question: I'm sorry, I meant 720.
Answer: Aircraft 720, as I recall it, was at the
southwest corner in the hangar."
So DiStefano concedes that prior to it being in
the hangar that day, during the pre-op, that's when these op
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
85
checks were done. Now, combined with that, Mr. Drechsler
testified, I think to Mr. Dunlap's questioning, on page 100:
"Question: The work card you described, 45904,
that's the de-icer card. The one you talked about is,
it still before you?
Answer: Yes.
Question: That's done as part of the induction
process normally?
Answer: It can be done at any time, but we like
it to be done early because if there is a valve to be
removed that failed the test, it gives us the time to
send it out, and get it back, so we don't have to buy
another whole valve, we can get the one repaired.
Question: Do you recall this was done on the run
up on 705?
Answer: That would not be done on a run up."
THE COURT: Let's slow it down.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
"Question: Do you recall it done on 705?
Answer: That would not be done on a run up.
Question: At the time before the plane came in?
Answer: It could be done on a pre-dock or first
days of the check."
Then he goes on to say that he saw Danny working
on the run up. He definitely ran the pre-dock of that
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
86
airplane.
So, both DiStefano and Drechsler concede that
this type of test can be done before the plane is in the
hangar and indeed, it's preferable that it be done early.
That's the sum total of the testimony. There's nothing
DiStefano said for which the inference can be drawn that
the work wasn't done.
He also, Your Honor, DiStefano wasn't quite clear.
DiStefano doesn't claim that he saw Mr. Gonzalez sign the
card. This is the card that he claims he saw on Gonzalez's
desk. When it comes in, it's signed. It could well have
been signed and done before that day in which he saw it.
Based on that evidence, Your Honor, there's
nothing more significant about that 90 minute period during
which the work was not done, and any other 90 minute period
during which the work was not done. There's nothing that
can be inferred from the fact that the work was not done in
that 90 minutes. Your Honor, that's all I have.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: With regard to the question, Your
Honor, of jurisdiction. Mr. Drechsler did testify, I'll
stop with that.
Your Honor, I want to go to Mr. Valenzuela -- I'm
sorry, I want to go back. With regard to Mr. Drechsler's
testimony on the issue of jurisdiction, Drechsler
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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testified:
"Question: Aserca is a Venezuela airline.
Answer: That is correct.
Question: Before Aserca could have its work done
by SabreTech at its facility, it sent representatives
up to do an inspection of that facility, is that
correct?
Answer. It sends its equivalent to the FAA
inspectors to look at the dates, yes.
Question: Venezuelan inspectors come up to look
at the facility?
Answer: They did.
Question: And those are Venezuelan FAA
inspectors? You said equivalent.
Answer: Equivalent.
Question: And they approved SabreTech as a
facility that worked?
Answer: They did."
So, the only testimony as evidenced in this
record, Your Honor, is that SabreTech did the work pursuant
to the approval of it as a facility by the Venezuelan FAA.
Your Honor, with regard to Mr. Valenzuela.
Valenzuela is charge with a false statement in counts three
and count four, which are the 0069 work cards related to the
generators. We, SabreTech, are charged vicariously with
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
88
liability for what alleged to be his false statements on
those cards.
Your Honor, with regard to the haz-mat counts --
THE COURT: That's count three, four and what?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Then there are the hazardous
materials counts which start at Count VIII, and then skip,
it's every even count, Count VIII through XXII. Count VIII
--
THE COURT: Any way to break this down and do it
by counts or something like that?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. If I may --
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: The government has charged
Valenzuela in counts 3 and 4 with a false statement, and
has charged SabreTech vicariously with liability for
Valenzuela's false statements.
THE COURT: What is the false statement?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: The alleged false statement is
that he filled out work card 0069 which is the work card
relating to the removal of oxygen generators from ValuJet
aircraft 803 V. V.
THE COURT: V, like in victor and V, like in
victor?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. Knowing in
truth and in fact, the work had not been performed as
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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described therein, and that shipping caps had not been
installed on unexpended oxygen generators. That's count 3.
Count 4 makes the same allegation with regard to
what is called a non-routine work card for that same order.
A non-routine work card, Your Honor, may recall is attached
to the routine work card and it incorporates it by
reference. The government alleges each card as a separate
false statement but with regard to the identical false
statement.
THE COURT: All right. So, now your motion is on
behalf of SabreTech with reference to the allegations of
false statement made in counts 3 and 4, where they are
charged with the responsibility, where SabreTech is charged
with -- they are charged with writing a document knowing it
to be false and fictitious, is that correct? I'm reading
it from the --
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. It's the
document allegedly filled out by Valenzuela. We are
charged with liability for that false statement as his
employer. In other words, we are vicariously liable for
his alleged false statement on that card.
THE COURT: All right, now then. And you say,
it's the same false statement, the identical false
statement, it was just on two cards. One was card 0069,
and one was the non-routine card?
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Your suggestion of entitlement to a
verdict on behalf of SabreTech is what?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: There's a total absence of
evidence with regard to Mr. Valenzuela making any
statements on either card in that faith knowing them to be
false. Total lack of evidence. The only evidence as
Ms. Heck, Ms. Miller mentioned that the government
presented with regard to Valenzuela, is the testimony of
Tommy Silvers.
You may recall, Your Honor, he is the witness who
testified through an interpreter. The government, in
effect, spent most of his testimony impeaching him. They
put him up as a witness just to knock him down.
His testimony, at the end of the day, that came
out was as far as he knew, Valenzuela had quite properly
checked the work on that card that he certified had been
done and had properly determined that it had been done.
That is the only testimony regarding what Valenzuela did or
did not do. The evidence from Silvers is that Valenzuela
signed that card, correctly certifying the work had been
done. Now with regard --
THE COURT: Silvers said that Valenzuela
performed the work?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: He testified, Your Honor, that
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
91
Valenzuela did not personally do the work, but that
Valenzuela determined personally that the work had been
done. That was the testimony, that was grand jury
testimony that was read in while he testified.
THE COURT: Is that part of this record now?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor, before the jury.
THE COURT: So you are saying that Mr. Silvers,
the mechanic, at what page of the record? That will help.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: On page 50 of the record on
November 19. May I read it to the Court?
THE COURT: On the record at page 50 of November
19. Mr. Silvers said, Valenzuela didn't do the work but
what, I know or I saw him. What did he say?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: The question was:
Question: Had Mr. Valenzuela inspected the work?
Answer: Yes, that's what we spent four hours
checking to make sure everything was right.
Question: So Mr. Valenzuela actually looked at
the work that was done?
Answer: Yes.
Question: That's what respect to what?
Answer: The installation of the CO2.
Question: When you say, the installation, you
mean the installation of the two generators, was that
the whole assembly in the aircraft? Or putting the
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
92
generators into the assembly?
Answer: Putting generators into the assembly.
Questions: Was that your testimony before the
grand jury?
Answer: Yes.
THE COURT: Who was questioning?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: This was Mr. Brigham.
THE COURT: The government was questioning?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: This was Mr. --
THE COURT: Cross examination.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Mr. Raskin read his grand jury
testimony.
THE COURT: I just wanted to know who was
questioning. It was cross examination, and Mr. Silvers
said, in effect, that the work was performed and all
Valenzuela did was certify that it had been done.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: He reviewed it on his own
knowledge. He reviewed it -- of his own personal
knowledge, saw that it was properly done. Your Honor may
recall, first Mr. Brigham questioned, impeached him with
grand jury testimony saying that Valenzuela didn't do the
work.
Then Mr. Raskin asked that the complete testimony
be read. At that point, the Court had Mr. Raskin read this
part of the testimony, which had been left out by
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
93
Mr. Brigham that showed that Valenzuela had personally
determined the work was done before he signed off on it.
With regard to the question, Your Honor, of
shipping caps. The only testimony by Mr. Silvers is that
he, Silvers, did not see shipping caps.
Question: By Mr. Brigham on page 51. Now, at
that time, what, if anything, were you doing with
respect to shipping caps?
Answer: We were not in charge of that.
That's the sole testimony with regard to
Mr. Silvers' knowledge of shipping caps. He said nothing
about whether Mr. Valenzuela had caps, did not have caps,
put caps on the generators he work on or not. There is a
total lack of evidence with regard to that matter. So
that's --
The question was asked again with regard to
Mr. Silvers. Mr. Brigham asked him on page 63.
Question: Did you see any safety caps on these
generators?
Answer: Mr. Silvers answered no.
Mr. Brigham never asked him was Mr. Valenzuela
present at that time? Does he know whether Mr. Valenzuela
saw safety caps? There's just no testimony at all with
regard to Mr. Valenzuela's knowledge or involvement with
safety caps. The sum total of his testimony is, that with
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
94
regard to the part of the work card relating to whether the
work was done, that Valenzuela did what he was suppose to
do, which was to check to make sure it had been done.
Your Honor, the work card is in evidence. But I
believe Silvers did not even testify that he saw Valenzuela
sign the card, sign those cards. I mean, an inference can
be drawn, but it's a very attenuated and weak inference that
Silvers testifies when they're walking away that Mauro
Valenzuela says to him, "now it's taken care of." But
that's all. But there's no, even in direct testimony, that
he saw him sign.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: I would like to turn to Count I,
which is a conspiracy count.
THE COURT: That's 3. And 4, you say, is alleged
to be the same alleged false statement?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you have any position with whether
or not two counts can be specified for one false statement?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. We had moved
before trial to require the government to elect on
multiplicity grounds, that they have alleged the identical
false statement in both counts, that count 4, -- that, in
fact, as the evidence shows, both of these documents were
attached one to the other.
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Count 4, the non-routine work card, in fact,
doesn't even make the false statement. Again, it simply
incorporates by reference the routine work card in Count 3.
So our argument was that that is multiplicitous, if there
is to be a charge that should go to the jury. It would be
that the government should choose one or the other. We
renew that motion. I believe Mr. Florence's counsel would
renew that same motion with regard to the false statements
counts made to Mr. Florence.
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to move onto
the next one?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. With regards to
count -- there's one more point that I wish to make with
regard to these two false statement counts, and
Ms. Moscowitz, I think, will expand upon this. These false
statements are alleged to be -- of these work cards -- are
alleged to be within the jurisdiction of the department of
transportation and the FAA. This is not the same
jurisdictional argument we made previously with regard to
Aserca.
It is alleged that these work cards are within
the jurisdiction of the department of transportation and
the FAA. With regard to these ValuJet work cards, we are
not arguing that they are not within the jurisdiction of
the FAA. These are the ValuJet work cards. The evidence
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does not show according to the allegations of the
indictment, that they are within the jurisdiction of the
department of transportation separately from the FAA.
In the introductory allegations of the conspiracy
on page 2, paragraph 3 defines the responsibilities of the
department of transportation as "including oversight and
regulation, including prescribing and enforcing standards
for the documentation and records of transportation of
hazardous materials."
Paragraph 4, describes the FAA's jurisdiction as
relating to oversight over documents concerning maintenance,
repair and maintenance of commercial aircraft.
Evidence shows that these routine work cards do
come within the scope of the FAA's jurisdiction, since they
are records of maintenance and repair of aircraft. But
there's no indication, at all, that these maintenance cards
come within the department of transportation's jurisdiction
insofar as it relates to documentation and records of
transport of hazardous materials. They're simply
maintenance cards. So insofar as these counts allege that
there is a complete failure of proof with regards to that
allegation.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Now, with regard to Count I, Your
Honor, may I continue?
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THE COURT: Yes, thank you. And I appreciate
your pausing. But yes, I'm all set.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Count I is a conspiracy count
which alleges that SabreTech, Mr. Gonzalez, Mr. Florence
and Mr. Valenzuela conspired to make false statements in
violation of 1,001. Now, so the indictment names four
conspirators. I think I want to put on the record, Your
Honor, that the government, pursuant to an order of this
Court requiring to name unindicted co-conspirators, named
three other SabreTech employees as unindicted
co-conspirators. So the entire conspiracy involves six
SabreTech employees.
Those other individuals, Your Honor, may have
heard the names are: David Wiles, W-I-L-E-S, according to
the evidence, he was a supervisor. He was a lead mechanic.
MS. MOSCOWITZ: Supervisor.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Luke, L-U-K-E, Kasamire
(phonetic), who was a lead mechanic. Ray Serano, who was a
lead mechanic.
THE COURT: Those are the three named defendants
here?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor.
Your Honor, Count I is defective, and we made this
motion pre-trial, because it alleges really two separate
conspiracies. There is a multiple conspiracy issue problem
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with Count I. The two parts to Count I, Your Honor, are
one, the allegations relating to Mr. Gonzalez and the Aserca
aircraft. The other part of Count I, the conspiracy, are
the allegations relating to the false statements relating to
the ValuJet aircraft.
Now, assuming for a moment that those allegations
are true, they, nonetheless, are two separate unrelated --
they allege two separate, unrelated conspiracies. The
Aserca Airlines work and any false statements made in
connection with that work, have nothing to do with the
ValuJet aircraft and any false statements made during the
course of the maintenance on the ValuJet aircraft.
There was no evidence that Mr. Florence,
Mr. Valenzuela, or the unindicted co-conspirators had any
connection with work done on the Aserca aircraft or any
false statements allegedly made on that aircraft. The only
alleged false statement which was made in relation to
Aserca, was made allegedly by Mr. Gonzalez.
Now originally, the government named Chris
DiStefano as an unindicted conspirator of Mr. Gonzalez. But
they then unindicted him, so he's no longer an indicted
co-conspirator. Had that remained, Mr. Gonzalez would have
been alleged to have his own co-conspirator. But as it is,
he is alleged by himself to have made the false statements
without anyone else's involvement.
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So these two schemes of false statements are
unrelated. There is no showing as well as, Your Honor, of
any evidence from which the inference can be drawn that
Mr. Gonzalez had any role in the alleged ValuJet false
statement conspiracy.
The only evidence relating to Mr. Gonzalez
relating to ValuJet is as follows: one, there is a document
in evidence where in early -- signed by Mr. Gonzalez, in
early May, 1996, putting SabreTech facility on a 7 day
workweek. Now, with regard to that document, Your Honor,
Ms. Miller conceded in opening that putting your facility on
a 7 day workweek is not a crime.
THE COURT: That's not evidence. I think we have
to go on what is in the record.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Okay, let me put it this way,
based on the record, there's no inference of criminality
can be drawn from that document. Indeed, Your Honor,
Mr. Ramos, who testified as a government witness, who was
one of the ValuJet tech reps, testified that he was aware
that it was common in the industry for there to be 7 day
workweeks, if required.
I believe, he testified that Mr. Simons, I'm
quoting from Mr. Ramos' testimony on page 177 on November
22,
Question: Mr. Simons also works full days, did he
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not, sir? 7 to 5 or longer?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Did you also observe that Mr. Simons,
who is the ValuJet employee who was frequently at
SabreTech, 7 days a week during this period of time?
Answer: Yes, ma'am.
Question: In your experience Mr. Ramos in the
aviation industry degree, that's not unusual, is it?
Answer: No, ma'am, not at all.
So no inference, there's nothing, no inference of
criminality can be drawn for Mr. Gonzalez of having put that
in effect. The other evidence --
THE COURT: Now, many of the items about which
there was testimony are totally innocent, in and of
themselves and standing alone. Just as in your typical
conspiracy driving a car from point A to point B, or going
to get gas for a car that is later used to transport drugs.
It may be totally innocent.
Does it, if it's in a conspiracy allegation, does
it become thereby, a part of bringing about the successful
conclusion of conspiracy. Now, here, as I understand Count
I, the conspiracy alleged is to make money by hurrying up
these repairs, renovations, G force jobs or G team jobs,
whatever they were, and that that's a conspiracy.
You are arguing, going back to your original
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premises, that Mr. Gonzalez was not involved or is not
alleged to have been involved in acting on both of what you
contend are unrelated conspiracy, that is, the Aserca job,
and the ValuJet job.
You say that Gonzalez acted alone, if he acted at
all, he acted alone on the Aserca job. The only contact he
had with the ValuJet job was issuing this memo, 7 days a
week. You led me into the Palmettoes on a pig trail, and
there's nothing wrong with that.
The question is whether or not that could be
construed as being somehow contributing to the successful
operation of the conspiracy, that has been alleged and the
issues whether or not that conspiracy has been established
at this point to withstand Rule 29.
What we have then is Mr. Gonzalez at least doing
some acts with reference to both Aserca and ValuJet. Now,
whether those acts constitute his involvement personally in
a conspiracy is a different matter. That's a different
issue.
Right now, we are dealing with whether or not
there is sufficient evidence to deal with conspiracy. And
of course, we all know that the conspirator cannot act
alone nor can he act in connection with the government.
When you get to Gonzalez acting only on Aserca, unless the
government can show these two are somewhat related as being
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part of one ongoing conspiracy, then he has act alone and
has not conspired with anyone, and is in pretty good shape.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: That really is not the heart of
our position, Your Honor. He is only alleged to acted by
himself on Aserca, and there's no showing of any connection
in terms of the work done or even temporarily between these
two separate jobs. Aserca was completed before ValuJet
began. There's no allegation that the work, there's no
evidence that the work on the Aserca job was hurried along
and not completed. If anything, -- I mean.
THE COURT: The other way around. I think Aserca
was delayed and late, and there's evidence of that in this
record which, if believed by the jury, could convince the
jury of that fact, at least.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: But nonetheless, the evidence --
even assuming that Gonzalez engaged in criminal activity on
Aserca, that is a separate series of criminal acts from
those alleged to be part of the ValuJet false statement
conspiracy. That's what we think is the essential defect
of that count is.
Aside from the question, Your Honor, I mean, Your
Honor is, of course, absolutely right. Even an innocent
letter like that putting the facility on a 7 day workweek,
can further the purpose of conspiracy, but that kind of
basic question of whether or not there's any evidence
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showing that Gonzalez has joined that conspiracy by a
willful act at all.
The only allegations of willful misconduct
against Gonzalez, it goes back to the allege false
statement on the Aserca de-icer card. If that fails, then
Gonzalez is not part of that conspiracy at all.
Your Honor, just in terms of tracking the
elements, there's no indication of any agreement expressed
or tacit between Gonzalez and anyone else between any of
these other named unindicted, indicted conspirators to
engage in this criminal conspiracy. It's just not there.
THE COURT: Now, this motion, of course, and
maybe out of necessity you are overlapping, but this motion
is on behalf of SabreTech. Now, SabreTech, in order to be
entitled to Rule 29 relief would have to show that none of
the six conspired, none of the six employees of SabreTech
conspired to be involved in a conspiracy to make materially
false statements concerning the matters within the
jurisdiction, concerning these work cards and that sort of
the thing.
So, it may well be that when we consider the --
well, I mean, certainly your argument would be relevant to
joining Mr. Dunlap's argument on behalf of Mr. Gonzalez on
this issue, but what would entitle SabreTech to possible
relief under Count I?
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MR. MOSCOWITZ: That Count I alleges two
conspiracies. In fact, the evidence shows that there was
two conspiracies rather than the one conspiracy that is
alleged. The remedy for -- where a conspiracy, in fact,
alleges both conspiracies, is dismissal under Rule 29.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: That is a fatal variance between
the proof and the allegations of the indictment.
Your Honor, with regard to the government's
allegations of motive, which is that there was this
financial motive to put the financial interest of SabreTech
ahead of the safety concerns in the conduct of the
activities, I don't think there's evidence in the record to
support that allegation of an improper profit motive, which
caused them to cross over the line in terms of the
responsibilities with regard to safety.
The only evidence regarding profit motive at all,
is this letter that was introduced today by Steve Towns to
ValuJet, which, and again, Mr. Towns is not alleged to be a
co-conspirator. He is the President of SabreTech. The
content of that letter, if anything, goes contrary to the
claim that SabreTech was engaging in cost cutting or cutting
corners.
Mr. Towns, in fact, says that it's clear that
because ValuJet is a valid customer, SabreTech is willing to
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pay up to $20,000 a day for the cost that ValuJet incurs in
terms of having to get substitute aircraft. That, on its
face, is an entirely proper and appropriate business
decision to be made.
That hardly supports an allegations of profit over
safety. All that shows is business dealing. There's just
no evidence beyond that. There's no evidence that any
executive of SabreTech ever said to any of these defendants
or any of these conspirators, just do what you got to do to
get this out. To the contrary. The evidence is, every
SabreTech mechanic who testified was asked by Mr. Raskin,
did anybody ever ask you to falsify documents? Did anybody
ever ask you to do anything improper? And each of them with
the exception of Mr. DiStefano, said no.
Your Honor, I want to turn next to the haz-mat
counts, the hazardous material counts which are, I think,
very confusing as they are laid out. These are Counts VII
through XXIII.
Just allow me, Your Honor, to outline how I want
to approach this because it's difficult to address all of
these at the same time. Counts VII through XXII allege,
skipping each count, violations of two statutes, two
hazardous materials statutes. So for example, Count VII
alleges a violation first of Section 5124 of Title 29, with
regard to violation of particular hazardous regulations.
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Then the next count, Count VIII alleges a
violation of the same regulations, but under a different
statute, Section 46312 of Title 49. Then, they proceed like
that for the next ten counts. Count IX is again a
regulatory violation of Counts III and XXIIII. Count X is
the same regulatory violation under Section 46312.
So that's the pattern. Each pair of violation
5124 and 46312 alleges a violation of the same regulation.
That's how it proceeds.
With regard to the alleged violations under the
first named statute, Section 5124, only SabreTech is alleged
to have committed the violation under 5124. And 5124 --
THE COURT: This is Count VII, IX, XI and so on?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes.
THE COURT: SabreTech is the only one charged in
those counts?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: That's right, Your Honor.
5124, we have the statute in front of us, makes it
a penalty for a person to willfully violate any regulations
prescribed under this chapter. Violations of 5124 are
specific intent crimes requiring showing of a willful
violation of regulations.
Then with regard to the violations of the other
Statute, 46312, that statute alleges both a willful
violation and a reckless violation. This is very confusing.
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It took us a while to catch on.
The willful violation is a person violates 46312,
if the person violates a regulation related to the
transportation of hazardous materials. If that person
violating that regulation willfully delivers or causes to be
delivered property containing hazardous material to an air
carrier, the operator of still aircraft or interest of
transportation. That's the willful violation. In each of
those 46312 counts, only SabreTech is charged with a willful
violation.
Now the second -- the lesser included is violation
charges that you violate that statute if you violate a
regulation in recklessly pausing the transportation in air
commerce of that property. Under the reckless violation
which is also alleged in each count, there Mr. Florence and
Mr. Valenzuela are charged together with SabreTech. If you
look at each of these even numbered counts under 46312, they
first allege a willful violation of the statute by
SabreTech, and then they allege the violation of the same
regulations by SabreTech, Florence and Valenzuela,
recklessly.
Now, with regard to, Your Honor, these
allegations. I want to say a few general points before I
get to the specifics of these counts, our understanding of
the law regarding corporate criminal liability and certainly
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the law in this Court and in the Circuit, that a corporation
is vicariously liable for the crimes committed by its
employees within the scope of their employment and in
furtherance of the interest of that corporation.
So, if any employee willfully violated the
statute in further in scope and in furtherance, then
SabreTech is liable. If any employee recklessly violated
the statutes, then SabreTech is liable for that reckless
violation. Corporate liability is entirely derivative and
vicarious. If no employee had the requisite intent and
committed the crime, then the corporation cannot be held
liability for that violation.
The government submitted a motion, a pleading this
morning suggesting that even if no individual employee can
be found to have committed the offense, committed willfully
and recklessly that the law permits aggregation of knowledge
and I think aggregation of willfulness of different
employees to make the corporation liable, even if no one
employee is liable. That is not the law in the Circuit. I
don't believe it is good law. The government relies on one
case, the United States v. Bank of New England which is a
Third Circuit case decided in 1988. It has not been
followed any of the Circuit, never been followed in this
Circuit Court.
That case really takes a good thing too far. It
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really extends the notion of the fiction of the corporate
defendant beyond what this Circuit has ever permitted in any
context. The closest, Your Honor, law on this issue which I
think we should go to this Circuit Court, which the
government has not cited is, and this is really by analogy
is, the law on a corporation being held liable for
conspiracy.
The law in this Circuit, Your Honor, is a
corporation is only liable for a conspiracy if two or more
of its employees, two or more natural persons engage in the
conspiracy. But a corporation and individual employee
cannot be held liable if the individual is not allege to be
in the conspiracy with another natural person. In other
words, this Circuit has held in case of United States v.
Stephens, 909 F.2nd 431. Even in a corporation could be a
part of a conspiracy, two or more natural persons are
required to be involved. That's, again, not precisely this
point. But the reason behind that, is a recognition that a
corporation is again a fiction, it's only composed of
individuals, and for there to be a true conspiracy, the kind
that the law is intended to address, you've got to have two
or more people actually conspiring.
I think that that is the law in this Circuit under
conspiracy and I think the same reasoning holds with this
notion of collective corporate knowledge or collected
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corporate willfulness. If no individual has the knowledge
requisite for that offense, and no individual has committed
willfully, then the crime hasn't been committed. The crime
hasn't been committed.
The reasoning that the Bank of New England relies
upon, the Bank of New England case, which again, I think it
goes too far, but even the Bank of New England, is that you
can attribute collective knowledge to a corporation where
there's some showing that the corporation has engaged in
willful and deliberate ignorance.
That it has so structured itself intentionally to
avoid having the requisite knowledge, so that it structures
itself so that no one person can be in a position where it
is said that that person is chargeable with knowing and
intending to do criminal acts. But that's the only
circumstance that even in the Bank of New England that this
notion of collective knowledge or willfulness is
permissible.
With regard, Your Honor, to the willfulness
charges, what's required to be shown -- what is required to
be shown specifically, Your Honor, again, these are willful
specific intent crimes. The evidence has to show that
individuals from the corporation, specifically knew of these
haz-mat regulations, and knowing these regulations,
willfully violated them.
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But there has to be a showing that the regulations
were known, and there has to be a showing that some
individual or more, one or more individuals, willfully
engaged in violation of those regulations. That is simply
-- I should say, Your Honor, that position, there's no law
on this issue under the statute.
This environmental statute is different than the
other environmental statutes we normally encounter, which
are used more commonly. Under most environmental statutes
are general intent crimes, where you don't have to show
specifically that the defendant knew he was violating
regulations. He simply had to show he knew what he was
doing. With regard to --
THE COURT: Now, now -- excuse me. You have
suggested that on these counts, the government has to prove
that two or more natural persons, individuals, knew of the
hazardous material regulations.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: At least one, Your Honor. These
are not conspiracy counts. At least one or more person
knew. I apologize.
THE COURT: So that two or more natural persons
dealt with Count I?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So now you are over into all of these
counts VII to XXIII.
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MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, didn't you argue that under the
vicarious liability theory that a corporation could only
act through the employees and that the government must
prove that two or more employees were liable in order to
find the corporation liable?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: I'm sorry, Your Honor. At least,
as I understand it, they would have to show that at least
one corporate employee had the requisite knowledge and
intent and committed this offense. I apologize.
THE COURT: All right. No, no. Was that the 909
F.2nd 431 case you cited?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: That case, Your Honor, I wasn't
clear. That case was a case this Circuit which related to
conspiracy, that a corporation, that an individual cannot
be held guilty of conspiracy with a corporation. He can
only be held guilty of conspiring with another live person.
A corporation, under that case of the 11th Circuit, can
only be liable for the conspiracy vicariously of, at least
two or more persons.
THE COURT: So there must be two or more persons,
under your submission, there must be two or more persons
who conspired together to violate the law, both of whom
were employed by the corporation in order for the
corporation to have any vicarious liability.
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MR. MOSCOWITZ: Under the conspiracy counts,
that's right. Under the hazardous materials counts which
are substantive counts, the government's position is we can
aggregate. Our position is the same. The corporation is
only vicariously liable if some employee committed the
offense.
If no one employee committed this offense,
knowingly and willfully committed the acts, then the
corporation can't be held liable. The government wants to
say that they don't have to show that any one employee
acted with willful purpose and intend. They can aggregate
knowledge, sent from one employee, another from another
employee and put it together and add it up to willfulness
on behalf of the corporation. And our position is that's
not the law in this Circuit, and it's bad law.
THE COURT: How many people do you contend, I
mean natural persons do you contend under your theory have
to be involved in the willful conduct for a criminal act to
occur?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: One full person, Your Honor.
There has to be only one person, at least one employee has
to commit the offense, all the elements of the offense. If
they can show -- there has to be at least one employee who
has committed this crime as alleged defined in the
indictment. What the government is alleging is that you
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can take knowledge and actions of innocent persons as well.
THE COURT: I understand their theory. I'm
trying now to focus on yours. You are saying that there
must be at least one individual that knew of the hazardous
material regulations, and at least one person who willfully
intended to violate the --
MR. MOSCOWITZ: It has to be the same person.
THE COURT: Same person?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. The evidence
has to prove the willful violation of these regulations.
They have to show that some employee first knew the haz-mat
table, knew these haz-mat regulations, and willfully
violated those regulations in the course of his employment.
THE COURT: Now, let's talk about the facts in
this record. Where do you suggest the dirt of information
or a dirt of factual basis for the willful intent to
violate. In other words, the charge, and we are getting
away from 1,001, aren't we?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So the charge is that somebody knew
that transporting in air commerce, materials that were in
violation of the Hazardous Materials Act was a crime or was
wrong or was violative, and that the person did it any way,
knowingly and willfully.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: That showing here would have to
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be, Your Honor, that at least one employee, at least one
employee, first of all, was aware that these oxygen
generators come under the hazardous material table as
hazardous material, hazardous waste. We are not arguing --
we concede that they are on the table as hazardous material
and hazardous waste. That's not an issue. But there's no
evidence that any SabreTech employee knew that the
generators were on that table as a hazardous material and
hazardous waste. There has to be that showing.
THE COURT: I presume that and I'm certainly not
trying to make the government's argument for them, but just
trying to so, we won't have to go back and forth like a
ping pong ball, go back and forth with new matters after
you sit down, but I presume that one of the things they may
argue is that the mechanics who worked on these oxygen
generators utilized the boxes that they unpacked the new
shipped generators from Scott Aircraft, and saw them
labeled or could have seen them, if they could or did not
close their eyes, that they were labeled hazardous material
and equipped with safety caps.
I presume that may be an argument they make.
What I'm trying to do is focus on the record we have before
us. I understand your theory, but applying it to this
record and you are suggesting there is no evidence. So
objectively, and being practical about it we might look at
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what is in the record and see whether or not that fulfills
that gap that you say is not there.
One would be the boxes. I suppose another would
be, the knowledge by the mechanics that when these things
exploded either accidently or sometimes on purpose, just to
see what they would do. They got hot. They heated up
immensely. Is that sufficient? You ask a silly question
and you get a silly answer. But I suppose you will contend
that was not sufficient to demonstrate that that would have
been reasonable notice by a reasonable airline mechanic
that these things were hazardous and if they were, of
course, he didn't know that specifically it violated
whatever it was, Section 59.02 or whatever but that -- what
is your position?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Specifically on the evidence,
first of all, the evidence with regard to the generators
themselves, the old one and the new ones which the
mechanics saw, there is no label or warning on the
generators that they are hazardous materials.
THE COURT: I agree with that.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: All the generators ever say is
these get hot and they can burn, but not that they are
hazardous material.
With regard to the box that these generators
arrive in, the only testimony that you heard from any
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mechanic with regard to the box was from John Taber. That
is, who said the box doesn't say on it "hazardous material."
The box simply has what he could see was part of this yellow
triangle or form that was partially obscured. But that's
all. There was no writing saying this is a hazardous
material. Your Honor, may recall that each mechanic who
testified was asked whether he had received hazardous
materials training, and each mechanic testified no, he had
not. So there is no showing -- we are talking about the
individuals -- there is no showing that any of these
mechanics had reason to know that these generators were a
listed hazardous material.
Now, the issue, did they know or were they aware
they were dangerous or unsafe, is a separate question. They
certainly testified that they were aware that there was some
danger involved with these. But that's not sufficient for
them to know that they are also a listed hazardous material
on the hazardous material table.
Now even with regard to the issue of danger, Your
Honor. The testimony that you heard from Mr. Taber is, he
understood there was some danger, but not that they were
even that dangerous, and he testified that based on what you
saw, he didn't think they could cause a fire.
You may recall, Your Honor, he testified that he
had the generators in a box with a plastic shield over them,
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and he came in the next day or whenever it was, these
generators were all together, and a number of them had the
shields melted, but there was no big fire. All that had
happened was some plastic on them had melted.
So certainly they knew they got hot. Certainly,
they knew there was some danger, but not that they knew they
could cause a fire and not that they had any reason to know
they were hazardous material. One doesn't infer, it's not a
question of inference, Your Honor, that something is on a
hazardous material table. It's a question of actually
knowing, and knowing about that table and knowing what's on
it.
THE COURT: I don't think that you're suggesting
that the government has to prove that an individual knew
the specific chemical propensity, and whether or not it was
on a government regulation table. Are you saying that?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor. I think the
case law supports that.
THE COURT: That these mechanics had to know that
the chemical context of these generators was labeled
hazardous material by whomsoever it was, the agency in
charge of that?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor, I believe that's
the law.
THE COURT: And you are suggesting that none of
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them knew that.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: There's no evidence that any of
them knew that. There's absolutely no evidence on the
record that they knew that. Let me cite a case that the
government cites, United States v. Moskowitz, which is a
second Circuit case. Moskowitz spelled with a "K," in
which the defendant was convicted of transporting hazardous
material on an aircraft, and part of the evidence that he
did it knowingly, was, in fact, that there were signs
posted in the airport as to what were hazardous materials.
So seeing those signs, he was charged with the knowledge of
that.
With regard to other statutes, Your Honor. I know
Your Honor is well familiar with the Trading With the Enemy
Act or with the Arms Export Control Act. The emissions
list, this maintains as to what constitute emission as to
which a license or permit has to be received from the
department of commerce so that you can legally export a
certain arm.
The law is, in that regard, Your Honor, that the
violation of the Arms Export Control Act is a specific
intent crime as this is. The evidence has to show that the
defendant is aware that the arms or gun that he is charged
with exporting is, in fact, on emissions control list. If
the evidence doesn't show that, he hasn't commit the
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offense. That is case law in this Circuit.
Likewise the Training with the Enemy Act relating
to Cuba, the evidence has to show that the defendant is
specifically aware of those regulations which prohibit
engaging in certain commerce with Cuba, not enough to know
that it's generally illegal, not enough to know when not to
do that, but the evidence has to show specific willfulness
that there was a specific awareness of the regulations.
Now, here, Your Honor, the first step is knowledge
that these things are hazardous materials. There was no
signs that these were hazardous materials.
This next issue of knowledge is that the mechanics
were aware of the regulations which they are alleged to have
willfully violated. Again, the case law I just cited
requires that where, what is charged as a willful violation
of regulations, promulgated under some statute, there has to
be showing that the defendant knew of those specific
regulations. There is no presumption of knowledge of the
law in this type of case.
I know, Your Honor is aware, and this came out
earlier, there are general intent crimes, other
environmental crimes where you can say, you presume that
people know what the law is. Where there is a willful
offense, there is no such presumption.
Now, here, Your Honor, the regulations, the
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hazardous regulations that the defendants are charged with
violating are quite specific. They are quite complicated.
They go to how these generators are to be labeled, packed,
shipped, all of those regulations. There is not a shred of
evidence in this record that these mechanics, Mr. Florence,
Mr. Valenzuela or anyone else, based on the evidence, had
any knowledge of those regulations. Unless there is showing
of knowledge of those regulations, they can't possibly be
charged with willful violation of them.
Now, the evidence is, Your Honor, in support of
that, that first of all, it is the case that none of these
mechanics received haz-mat training. So no inference can be
drawn that they knew of these regulations. The evidence is
that these mechanics, Your Honor, were not involved in
shipping. Shipping anything, let alone hazardous materials,
was not part of their duties or what they were expected to
do. Robert Rodriguez testified. He was one of the
mechanics who testified, that they simply didn't engage in
shipping. That was not part of their work.
With regard to the shipment of these generators,
Your Honor, there is no evidence at all that these mechanics
knew or had any reason to know, that these generators, in
fact, were going to be transported which is a critical
element of the defense where the company is accused of
willfully transporting them, and individuals are accused of
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recklessly causing them. The only evidence in the record as
to what they believed was going to happen to these
generators comes from Mr. Rodriguez, and comes from
Mr. Taber.
Mr. Rodriguez testified, forgive my language, that
he was told by his supervisor that these were going to be
shit-canned. They were garbage. They would be thrown away.
Mr. Taber testified that he likewise understood
that these generators were simply going to be disposed of.
That he did not believe or expect and no one said anything
to him to lead him to believe or expect, that they were
going to be transported.
The COURT: How does this effect the liability or
responsibility of SabreTech? Certainly SabreTech employees
participated in the actual transportation, not perhaps
Mr. Gonzalez or Mr. Florence, but certainly the shipping
clerks, the driver, the other people. Those were all
people that took -- not the driver. The other people took
them over and dropped them at the entrance way and one of
the employees of SabreTech walked them to the ValuJet
shipping outfit. Certainly, that was clear that they were
-- SabreTech had to know that they were going to transport
by invitation and knowledge. I mean --
MR. MOSCOWITZ: This gets the question of whether
you combine knowledge and intent from different employees
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or it has to be at least one employee that committed the
offense.
The COURT: Is this argument mostly for the two
individual defendants then? How does this effect
SabreTech?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: First of all, Your Honor, with
regard to the two individuals, Mr. Florence and
Mr. Valenzuela, there's a total lack of evidence with
regard to their having any criminal intent, so SabreTech,
therefore, if the government bases it on what they did,
SabreTech is not liable also.
Let's talk about the other employee who was
involved in the transportation, who is Andy Salis, who is
the subject of testimony here. Mr. Salis, by the way, Your
Honor, is not named by the government as a co-conspirator in
this conspiracy alleged in this case. The testimony -- the
evidence in regard to Mr. --
The COURT: Now we are on the haz-mat. We are
not on conspiracy. What we are dealing with whether or not
SabreTech can be liable if one of its employees actually
takes these materials and takes them over to be shipped,
knowing they are going to be shipped on an airplane.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: So with regard, let's focus on
Mr. Salis, who is the testimony of the person who is
responsible for shipping these generators. Now the
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testimony is that Mr. Salis is the only person in the
shipping and receiving department who is involved with
shipping.
It was mostly, Your Honor, a receiving
department. The other employees, Mr. Ingram testified that
they were the ones in the receiving, and Mr. Salis did the
shipping. There is no evidence that Mr. Salis knew that
these oxygen generators were hazardous materials. So he
didn't have that knowledge that this was a hazardous
material he was shipping.
Two, there is a total lack of evidence, no
evidence, that Mr. Salis was aware of the hazardous
material shipping regulations under which hazardous
material have to be shipped. So there's no showing again
that he could be charged with specific, willfully violating
those regulations.
More importantly, or equally important, Your
Honor, is there is a break in the chain between what the
mechanics did and knew, and what Mr. Salis did and knew.
There is no evidence that Mr. Salis had any discussion with
these mechanics about these generators. There's no evidence
that any mechanic said anything to Mr. Salis to suggest to
him, let alone that they were hazardous materials but that
they were unsafe in any way. A total absence of evidence.
Indeed, you heard from Mr. Taber that when he
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brought them to the ValuJet hold, he just basically put them
down and had no discussion with Mr. Salis about that.
The COURT: He refused to go in. He didn't want
to deliver them to the shipping clerk of the ValuJet
company. He refused to cross the threshold and somebody
else took them.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, in terms of what
Mr. Salis did and knew, was Mr. Salis who filled out the
form identifying these shipping ticket as oxygen generators
empty, empty. That's what was presented to the ValuJet
ramp agents when they loaded them on the plane. The was
that description.
Mr. Taber testified, who is the mechanic who
filled out a number of green tags on these generators, that
he didn't write and no one else wrote empty. All he wrote
was out-of-date. Out-of-date. There was no other
communication between Taber, the mechanics and Salis.
The COURT: Let me get this straight. The other
man. Whatever his name was, what was his name?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Mr. Salis.
The COURT: No.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Taber. He was the mechanic.
The COURT: Taber said he wrote on the oxygen
generators out-of-date.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor.
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The COURT: What did the assistant to Mr. Salis,
the fellow that testified through the interpreter? What
did he say. He wrote oxygen generators empty?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Empty. At Mr. Salis's direction.
The COURT: Salis said here. Fill out this pad.
Here is one and do them all. So some of them had oxygen
generators empty. Some of them had oxygen generators
out-of-date. But they all had all three on them.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: No, Your Honor. The oxygen
generators when the mechanics finished working with them,
when they tie them up, they each put a green tag on each of
them. The green tags, the green tag is saying that this
item is no longer to be used, but the is potentially
repairable.
The green tags if they said anything described on
them just said out-of-date, which they were. None of the
green tags prepared by the mechanics said empty. It's
Salis in shipping who receives them, and according to the
evidence, on his own decides what that means is empty. But
there's no showing of the basis for his putting empty on
them.
Now there's the government, I don't believe that
even the government contends that Salis, when he wrote
empty, did that knowingly and willfully, intentionally to
mislead anybody so that these would be loaded on to the
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plane. Somehow there is a disconnect here or a
miscalculation that Salis innocently and tragically
construes out-of-date to mean empty.
But it's that misstatement, and during the
testimony the government even shrank from calling that a
false statement. It's a incorrect statement, which allows
these to be transported and shipped. There's a total lack
of evidence that Mr. Salis made this statement and shipped
these knowingly and willfully with the intention to knowing
that it was in violation of any regulations.
There's no indication, Your Honor, that Salis even
saw the boxes that the new generators came in, which had the
yellow sticker on the which was partially obscured. You'll
recall the testimony was that those boxes come in through
the receiving part. Salis's function is shipping. So, we
don't even know -- there's no evidence that he even saw the
yellow sticker on the new boxes. There's a total lack of
evidence that Salis was on notice that these were hazardous
materials or even that they were dangerous.
If its not the mechanics, Your Honor, if they are
not charged with knowledge, intent, foreseeability, then
they are not the basis for a willful violation by SabreTech.
The only person who is involved in transportation on behalf
of SabreTech, who could be the basis for SabreTech's
vicarious liability, is Mr. Salis and his assistant.
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There's just a total lack of evidence showing he knew these
were hazardous materials, he was aware of the hazardous
material regulations and that he made this statement and
loaded these on to the airplane with any bad intent.
Now, Special Agent Gentile, the FAA inspector,
testified that he spoke to Mr. Salis several days after the
event. Mr. Salis testified that it was his decision to load
these on the airplane and return them. He said he believed
he was authorized to do that, but the was his decision alone
to do that.
Again, there is just nothing in the record to
suggest it was clearly an incorrect decision. But, there's
nothing to suggest it was a willful or criminal decision. I
know of no evidence which would support that inference.
That's really what these charges are about. If it's not the
mechanics or not Salis, then nobody committed a willful
violation of these regulations. It's really that simple.
With regard, Your Honor, SabreTech is also charged
in Count XXIII with willfully failing to --
The COURT: Before you start on Count XXIII,
that's at next one in line?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Yes, Your Honor.
The COURT: Let's take a brief recess for the
court reporter and we'll take a short break.
[There was a short recess].
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COURTROOM DEPUTY: Court is in session.
The COURT: Be seated, please.
MS. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, may I step out to get
Mr. Dunlap?
The COURT: Yes, of course, Mr. Moscowitz.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, before I move to
Count XXIII, with regard to the even number of counts under
46312, which are the counts in which both Mr. Florence and
Mr. Valenzuela are charged with recklessly causing the
transportation in commerce of these hazardous materials
with regard to -- first of all, Ms. Moscowitz will argue on
Mr. Florence's behalf and derivatively on the corporation's
behalf in regard to Mr. Florence.
With regard to Mr. Valenzuela, again, there is
simply a total absence of evidence in the record with
regard to Mr. Valenzuela's state of mind, knowledge of
these regulations, intent or anything. And that is, again,
the sum total of evidence about Mr. Valenzuela is what we
heard from Mr. Silvers. That can't possibly give rise to
an inference that Mr. Valenzuela is at all reckless with
regard to the transportation of these goods.
The only evidence with regard to the mechanics
with what they knew, comes from Mr. Taber and Mr. Rodriguez
that they believed these were going to be not transferred
and thrown away. Now, with regard, Your Honor, to each of
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the counts, the haz-mat counts, where --
The COURT: Let's go through this just one more
time. You say that on Count XXIII SabreTech should be
entitled to Rule 29 relief, because there's no evidence
that it failed to ensure that each of its haz-mat employees
was trained, right? It's your argument that on Count
XXIII, they provided training?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: No, Your Honor. The evidence
shown so far is from several mechanics who testified that
they were not trained. Count XXIII is again a willful
violation of the requirement that a haz-mat employer
provide training. The record is clear at this point that
no such training was provided. But the evidence has to
show that the failure to provide training was a willful
failure.
Now, the first element, SabreTech is required to
provide training if it is a haz-mat employer. No evidence
at all, that SabreTech as an entity was aware that it was a
haz-mat employer, that it was involved in the
transportation of hazardous materials under that
regulation.
So that's the first element. Not just is it a
haz-mat employer, but does the evidence show that it knew
it was a haz-mat employer that had the obligation to
provide such training.
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The second thing, is again, except that it is so
far in this record undisputed that no employee had such
training. But the issue is, did SabreTech know it was a
haz-mat employer, willfully fail to ensure that each of its
haz-mat employees were trained.
Then again, there's no evidence of willfulness.
The kind of evidence you would expect that you bring in
SabreTech managers and supervisors who we knew we had this
obligation to train the employees, but it was too
expensive, so we decided to save the money and not do it.
That would be evidence of willfulness, and
there's just no evidence of that at all. For all we know,
SabreTech was unaware that it was a haz-mat employer and
unaware that it had that obligation to provide haz-mat
training.
I should say on this record, that that's not, as
I say that, that is not unreasonable. Although
reasonableness is the standard. You heard the testimony
from Mr. Rodriguez that they weren't involved in shipping.
That was not part of their duties. The testimony that you
heard from Mr. Ingram was SabreTech was a receiver of
haz-mat goods. It received them. Although even Mr. Ingram
said, that the receipt of haz-mat goods was not a common or
frequent occurrence. But that's different as to whether it
if was a shipper. As I say, the evidence does not show a
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willful violation of that training obligation. I don't
believe its sufficient to show, to draw the inference from
the mere fact that they were in training.
The COURT: Could hypothetically, could Mr. Jones
decide he is going to ship on an American carrier to some
South American country that was in the throws of some civil
unrest, five boxes of hand grenades, and he doesn't know if
it is, it may not be hazardous material, I don't know.
But let me assume that the composition of a
grenade hypothetically anyway. We could pick something
else out, but could Mr. Jones who manufacturers grenades,
occasionally he ships them to somebody, occasionally he
sells them on the black market or to the public, could he
take them out in boxes and ship them assuming he didn't
know the regulations that precluded it, and assume that he
wasn't a regular shipper that this was just isolated and
every now and then he sent them to countries in South
America to one side or the other who had civil unrest.
Would that, under your theory, the government
would have to prove that he knew that the was a haz-mat
material and that -- let's assume that he had some people
that drove it out to the airport materials and he willfully
didn't train them about handling grenades. Could that
work? Is that all you would have to do is say, gee, I
didn't know about the regulation?
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That's a bad example. The an unfair example.
Let's assume somebody makes fertilizer and ships it to
wherever, and let's assume that at some point in time, the
fertilizer for some reason a particular brand becomes a
hazardous material, by being listed on one of these lengthy
tables that they publish every now and then, a person
continues to she did the, doesn't train employees, didn't
know about the, can he say "I just didn't know about it" or
is there an obligation for him to learn about it?
MR. MOSCOWITZ: What he is doing may violate
other statutes, but under this statute, there's no
affirmative obligation to learn it. The evidence has to
show that either he knew it or that he was willfully blind
to that obligation. He certainly couldn't close his eyes
to it if there was enough evidence to show that he knew it.
That would be the government's burden to show that either
he knew and ignored it, or if he willfully closed his eyes
to that. If, in fact, he didn't know he may be negligent.
There may be 50 other regulations and statutes that he
violated, but he hasn't violate these particular statutes
would do require specific knowledge of the regulations and
bad intent.
The COURT: The 11th Circuit just came out with
an opinion recently. One of Judge O'Kelley's cases. I
don't know the name, but it was in Georgia. And it dealt
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with the transporting, it's a criminal case, transporting
of the run off of materials that made some sort of chromium
device. He manufactured in, I believe Ohio, and then
shipped it down to Georgia or something like that. The
recent case on that dealt -- that may have been something
that was just grossly closing one's eyes to. I don't know.
MR. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, I think what is
significant here is there are other statutes that regulate
transport of hazardous materials of environmentally
sensitive materials, and they are often generally not
specific intent crimes. They don't require proof of
willfulness or specific knowledge the way these statutes
to.
It's possible that these violations could have
been charged under another statute which would not have the
same high evidentiary requirement, but certainly under
these statutes, which the government has chosen to rely on,
they have to meet that burden.
As I said, I think the analogy here are to the
arms export control cases, the trading with the enemy act
cases. All cases where the Court has held that you've got
to know what's on the emissions list to be held liable for
those violations. This is no different. So our position
is simple.
On this training obligation, there's just no
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evidence that we knew there was a haz-mat employer, no
evidence that we knew that we were required to train, and
no evidence that we willfully refused to do it for any
reason.
The last count, Your Honor, is the anti-sabotage
count, Count XXIIII, which I'll be brief on because I think
we have argued it several times.
Count XXIIII alleges, this is under Title 18,
United States Code, Section 312 that SabreTech knowingly
placed a destructive device and substance, that is oxygen
generators, on the ValuJet aircraft, and did so knowingly
and willfully make and cause that aircraft to be made
unworkable and unusable, and hazardous to work with and use.
Now, our position is, again, I do want to expand
on this briefly and then I'm almost done, that there is a
total lack of evidence to support an inference that
SabreTech willfully placed an explosive device on this
aircraft.
The first point I would like to make, Your Honor,
is this statute has its own definition of what an explosive
device is, and that's different than hazardous materials.
So even if it turns out that generators are hazardous
materials, even if one thought there was evidence that we
willfully caused the transportation of hazardous materials
that's not what is alleged here.
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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Here it is alleged that willfully placing an
explosive device, a destructive device, on the aircraft.
And the allegation is that the generators are explosive
devices. Now here on the corporation's charge, the issue we
argued before is the issue is, this is again, a specific
intent crime, that alleges that SabreTech willfully placed
these devices on the aircraft and willfully made the
aircraft unworkable and unusable, and hazardous to work with
and use.
Previously, we had the argument, what does it mean
to say that a defendant willfully placed an explosive on an
aircraft. The government has argued looking at the
legislative history of this statute, that they're not
required to show in addition to willfulness, that there was
an intent to destroy the aircraft as an additional element.
Our position, as the Court well knows, that what
only resort legislative history, if there's some ambiguity
in the statute, if there's something unclear. I don't
believe there is anything unclear about the allegations or
the requirement that what is required is evidence that the
defendant willfully placed a destructive device on an
aircraft.
What does it mean to willfully placed a
destructive device on a aircraft on an aircraft. What does
it mean to willfully place a destructive device on an
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
137
aircraft? I mean, to do that with bad purpose and bad
intent that could only mean that one intends to cause harm
in some sense to that aircraft.
There's no additional requirement to that but
that's the only common sense meaning of that act as a
willful act. There's just a total lack of evidence that
SabreTech or any of the employees caused those generators to
go onto that aircraft willfully believing, knowing that they
would make and cause that aircraft to be made unworkable and
unusable and hazardous.
I think it significant that the indictment charges
not only that SabreTech willfully placed the explosive or
destructive device on the plane, but willfully made and
caused the aircraft to be made unworkable and unusable.
I don't know if that second willfulness is
required by the statute, I believe it is. But, that is what
the government had alleged, and there's a total lack of that
evidence.
Again on this question of corporate liability,
SabreTech, no individuals are charged in this count. Only
SabreTech as the corporation is charged. SabreTech is
liable if the evidence shows that some employee in the scope
of his duties seeking in some sense to benefit the
corporation, willfully committed this offense.
The question is who are we talking about? Who are
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we taking about? The only employee who caused and placed
these generators on the plane is, again, Andy Salis and his
assistant.
I won't go through the facts again, but there is
just no evidence that Mr. Salis did that with knowledge that
these were destructive devices. He believed they were
empty. He believed they were not destructive. Maybe
incorrectly, but that was the only evidence of his belief.
There was no evidence to suggest that he was lying when he
thought they were empty. There's no evidence that he did it
with unlawful purpose or with a bad purpose. If it's not
Andy Salis, who else is it?
Your Honor, I think it's a total lack of evidence
supporting this allegation. This count, as well, should not
be permitted to go to the jury. Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, one more thing. I do want to renew
the motion that we made before trial.
The COURT: All counsel has done all of that.
You are fully protect.
Ms. Moscowitz, insofar as it is humanly possible,
I would ask you not to duplicate or repeat the arguments
that have been made, since we started this morning with the
arguments at 11:15. It is now 4:25. We took an hour and a
half out, but it's been about 3 and a half or 4 of Rule 29
motion. So as best you can, if you could restrict it to
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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your client and not be repetitive, as far as you can.
MS. MOSCOWITZ: I can't talk as much as he can,
Your Honor.
The COURT: Mr. Moscowitz, you should get a copy
of that and take it home and show it to your children. All
the kids will laugh. All right.
MS. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, I also renew all of
our prior motions.
The COURT: That's done on behalf of everybody.
You are fully protected and so on.
MS. MOSCOWITZ: With respect to Count I
Mr. Florence moves for a motion for judgment of acquittal.
There has been no evidence that he entered into any
agreement to be part of any conspiracy charged in the
indictment.
There is an object of the indictment which is to
place the short term business and pecuniary interest of
SabreTech ahead of other concerns. There is no evidence
that Mr. Florence did that.
There is an allegation of the manner and means
are that the work that was the mechanics did was rushed and
compressed. There has been no evidence that the work was
rushed and compressed.
The was also the manner and means that there was
pencil whipping, that employees and contract personnel
UNITED STATES vs SABRETECH, ET. AL - 11-29-99
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would and did bow to SabreTech managerial and supervisory
pressure to do pencil whipping, to certificate work that
hadn't been done. Every mechanic that testified, testified
that he had not done such a thing and was not aware of such
a thing. There is, therefore, no evidence that
Mr. Florence entered into a conspiracy to accomplish any of
those things.
At most, that count shows multiple conspiracy.
With respect to Mr. Florence, there is no showing that he
had any knowledge of relationship to dependents on anything
related to the Aserca aircraft. There's not even a showing
that he worked on the Aserca aircraft, that he was aware
that the plane was in. There is just nothing to tie him to
any continuous series of items or any agreement that
encompasses the Aserca aircraft.
Your Honor, with respect to Counts V and VI, those
are the counts that charge Mr. Florence with two false
statements. The false statements related to the 69 work
card, and to its cover sheet which is numbered 178. Those
are counts that are multiplicitous.
Your Honor had denied the motion without
prejudice. There is no question, but that they describe the
same work that is in Exhibit 25. If Your Honor looks at it,
and I will hand it up, if Your Honor is curious at this
point, but the 69 work card is the work card that states,
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that has the whole description of what to do with oxygen
generators. In it, it says, if the generator is not
expended, install a cap.
The other one, a card numbered 178, is the cover
sheet which reads only remove and replace oxygen generators
per 0069 attached. I asked -- it's clear looking at them
that they described the identical work. I asked Mr. Ramos
if they described the same work. On November 22, 1999 at
page 180, he confirmed that those two cards described the
same work. I don't think there's any question that if those
counts remain, only one of them can remain.
The counts are also defective as Mr. Moscowitz
stated because they seem to reference two different
jurisdictions of the department of transportation and the
FAA. That's covered. I won't say it again. The card is
however, inherently ambiguous and impossible to perform as
written. This is both a specific intent crime, and not one
in which we can say, well he should have understood. The
government's whole point is that instruction should be
followed exactly.
This is the card, Your Honor, that says, "install
shipping cap on firing pin." I think that's talking about
the 69 work card, is Count V. That you cannot install a
shipping cap on a firing pin. That is, what Mr. Gentile
testified about. It is clear that as he demonstrated, Your
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Honor, that if you install a shipping cap on a firing pin it
just falls off. You cannot have a instruction and convict
somebody of a false statement for something that can't even
be done. That is what he demonstrated, Your Honor, when he
put the thing on and it falls off, and it doesn't stay there
and provide any protection.
There's an 11th Circuit case. The Manapat, it's
funny, it deals actually with a FAA false statement. United
States v. Manapat, 928 F.2nd 1097, 11th Circuit 1991. It
states, when a record that you are allegedly making a false
statement on is inherently ambiguous, you can't be convicted
of making a false statement on it. And if this is something
that doesn't even work because it falls off, then how can he
be guilty of failing to follow that instruction. That's
completely in the record per Agent Gentile's testimony. The
instruction on that work card could not --
The COURT: Is he charged with failing to follow
the instruction or certifying that he did follow the
instruction?
MS. MOSCOWITZ: He's charged with a false
statement he allegedly signed. Although there's really no
testimony that he signed. I think its sufficient. I know
juries are privileged to use their own eye balls and look
at handwriting. He signs off -- I have to kind of back
into it. It says, "if generator is not expended, install
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shipping cap on firing pin." I don't think you can follow
an instruction that can't be followed.
The COURT: But then he signed it. He did just
that, is that it?
MS. MOSCOWITZ: Well, he allegedly signed, he --
THE COURT: I don't ask you to admit that he sign
that. But his signature appears there, that yes, I did
not. I put on the firing pin. Now, he's charged with
marking false statement, he's not charged with failing to
an impossible job, is he? Isn't that the problem we had
with this?
MS. MOSCOWITZ: Well, perhaps, but of course, if
it is not false for that regard, it certainly can't be
material if all it would do is fall right off. I don't
think he can be charged, it's now charged with the work,
it's something related with the work, Judge.
He's charged with the false statement if that
statement provides no protection whatever, it is certainly
immaterial. And materiality is something that the
government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and it is
a factual matter, and that certainly makes it completely
immaterial if it provides no protection whatever.
There is no evidence of bad intent. There is only
evidence of Mr. Florence acting in good faith. Now, these
are issues obviously that become jury issues, and I
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understand that, but this is a specific intent crime.
Mr. Florence exits the picture long before, in March is the
last time there is any evidence of him having anything to do
with these generators. That's the back drop with which we
approach the hazardous materials counts.
Now I don't know if Your Honor has looked at these
counts. But Mr. Moscowitz says it took him a long time to
figure out how they worked, and I'm behind him because I
haven't figured out how the incorporation works, and how
SabreTech can be charged with willfully and recklessly in
the same count. But there are counts VIII, X, XII, XIIII,
XVI, XVIII, XX and XXII, charging Mr. Florence with reckless
violation of shipping, packing, labeling, classing and all
sorts of things which deal only with the transportation of
hazardous materials.
According to the indictment and to the regulations
under which these charges are brought, Mr. Florence must be,
in order to be liable under any of these charges, what's
called a haz-mat employee. That's defined in paragraph 30
of the indictment, which notes that the hazardous materials
regulations apply to "each person who performs or causes to
be performed functions related to the transportation of
hazardous materials, including determination of and
compliance with basic conditions for offering hazardous
materials in transport. Filling packages, marking and
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labeling pads, preparing shipping papers, handling loading,
securing and segregating packages within a transport vehicle
or cargo hold and transporting hazardous materials."
There is no evidence that brings Mr. Florence
within the category being a haz-mat employee such, that
these regulations should apply to him, even before we
address questions of what is reckless and what is willful.
The facts in this case demonstrate the following:
Mr. Florence, together with a group of other mechanics,
participated in the removal and replacement of oxygen
generators. In late March, latest early April, he
participated with at least Mr. Taber and Mr. Rodriguez in
cleaning up the generators from the 802 area, and that was
when they carefully wrapped the lanyards around the firing
pin, then wrapped them around the body of the generator,
tied them down and then they tagged them entirely and
accurately as 02 generators out-of-date. There is the one
that remained on the premises in evidence which Mr. Taber he
signed and confirmed, and there is no contradictory evidence
that Mr. Florence did exactly what he did with the
generators and did also the same tags.
So the mechanics did what they could to secure the
generators. The evidence is also uncontradicted that the
mechanics, including Mr. Florence were informed that these
generators were going to be disposed of, not that they were
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going to be transported.
So that leaves -- Mr. Florence leaves them
according to the statement of Special Agent Gentile also
uncontradicted, in late March or early April, on a cart on
near 02, and doesn't see them again. The generators are
taken by Mr. Taber and Mr. Rodriguez to the ValuJet hold
area. They leave them there. There they are tagged as
oxygen generators out-of-date. Not oxy canisters, not
empty.
Andy Salis who comes independently into the story
via either his misunderstanding of what ValuJet or his boss
instructed, but on his own according to Special Agent
Gentile, decides that the oxygen generators are to be
returned to ValuJet via flight 592.
The government has stated throughout when they
talk about the shipping ticket, it's been referred to as an
inaccuracy. The government acknowledges that Mr. Salis made
a mistake. He made a tragic mistake. There's no question
about that. But there is no connection with what he did and
what the mechanics, including Mr. Florence did.
Mr. Florence did not pack the generators for shipment. He
stated that to Agent Gentile, and mechanics Taber and
Rodriguez confirmed that mechanics don't ship, that they did
not anticipate that these generators would be shipped. The
boxes were filled to overflowing, Judge. All of their
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testimony is that the boxes were open because the generators
were up over the top of them. There's no question they were
not packing them to ship them. Because you put something in
a box to clean it up and put the some place else, does not
mean that to you are preparing it for shipment. In fact, as
Mr. Florence stated to Special Agent Gentile, he did not
think that was their final packaging. As Mr. Taber stated
to Your Honor and the jury, he did not think this was the
final packaging. He did not expect that these things would
be shipped.
There is a complete breakdown in the causal chain
between Mr. Florence who leaves these generators, tagged
accurately, made safe enough to be disposed of. After all
Mr. Taber testifies that the purpose that they understood
the cap was for was to protect themselves and the generator
from going off. They've done that. They're beyond that
step. Now they are just waiting to be thrown away
appropriately after ValuJet decides who is going to get rid
of, how they're going to be gotten rid of, and they make
them safe to that point.
He leaves them where they are in a box on the side
of the plane. He did doesn't even participate in taking
them to the ValuJet hold area. He is out of the picture
except vis-a-vis the signature by late March or early April,
and Salis makes his own determination relating to nothing
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that the mechanics did in May 10 or May 11 to put these --
to have these generators taken to the ValuJet to be loaded
onto that plane.
There is also the issue with respect to the
hazardous materials counts as to Mr. Florence's training.
The seems hard for me to understand how he could be -- how
the company could be charged with failing to train him, and
then there could be this issue about whether he knew or
didn't know these materials were hazardous.
Again, Your Honor, nobody disputes that they were
dangerous. I noticed in a pleading filed by Ms. Miller that
the says the mechanics talked about their intense heat.
That's not all the record. The record says, they said some
heat. They get hot. Even Mr. Brennan, the Scott Aviation
oxygen generator expert spoke about the fact that you could
hold them for 3 minutes before you couldn't hold them in
your hands anymore, and also, you could expend everyone in
the airplane, that was the safe way to do the before even
taking them out of the airplane before you were going to
change them but they knew they got hot.
There was nothing that said to the mechanics these
are hazardous materials as called for under the C.F.R.
Didn't say the on the generators, either before 88 or after
88. There was a part of the yellow label that doesn't say
hazardous materials at all. The just a yellow label peeking
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out of the box. We don't know if Mr. Florence saw it or
not. We know that Mr. Taber saw a partially obscured yellow
label on the box the new generators came in. That's --
There is, therefore, no ability -- the government
has not shown in any way either of two things, one that
Mr. Florence knew that these were hazardous materials as
listed in the C.F.R. as opposed to, are these things that
you wouldn't want to pop off and throw around, but there's
nothing that says he treated them that way. There's nothing
that says he's a haz-mat employee.
The regulations do not apply to him. Everybody in
a company can't know everything that everybody is doing.
There's this company called Dangerous Goods, Inc. that did
service for SabreTech. They probably have an accountant
that works for them. The accountant doesn't necessarily
know how to handle hazardous materials. Mechanics may
handle goods that turn out to be dangerous, but this act
applies to hazardous materials transportation.
It applies to people who are in the business of
getting these hazardous materials from point A in this city
to point B either in this city or some place else. That is
never the mechanics. It is hardly even shipping and
receiving at SabreTech, because what they usually do is get
parts in and put them on a plane. They don't do much
sending out of parts.
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Specifically, with respect to Mr. Florence, there
is no evidence that puts him anywhere near shipping and
receiving. The only evidence in the record for Mr. Taber
and Mr. Rodriguez is mechanics don't ship. They aren't
trained to ship in general. And specifically, they did not
know these generators would be shipped. They never
discussed that they would be shipped. They did not plan for
them to be shipped. They did not pack them to be shipped
because they did not think they were going to be shipped.
The evidence is without a doubt that generators were going
to be disposed of.
If you have no questions. That's really what the
is.
Oh, I have one thing actually, that I think is
kind of interesting, Judge, that I wanted to add. I don't
know whether to file it or not. I was reading Mark Gentile,
the FAA special agent's report. Particularly, on the
section where he's dealing with haz-mat employees. He says
haz-mat employees and he lists --
The COURT: Is this in the record?
MS. MOSCOWITZ: It's not, but in a certain sense
it's a legal opinion.
The COURT: If it's not in the record, I'm sorry.
We have got enough, that is, in the record to deal with.
MS. MOSCOWITZ: Your Honor, the reckless
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standard requires a conscious disregard of a highly known
risk, gross deviation. There's no evidence to show that.
The COURT: All right. thank you. Now,
Ms. Miller and Mr. Brigham, it's now almost 5:00 in the
afternoon. I really don't know. We started at about 11:15
with arguments, but, of course, we are here at 9:00 with
other matters. You have listened to about 4 hours. We
have all listen today about 4 hours of argument on a very
lengthy indictment, 24 counts or 23 counts whatever it is.
And so I do not wish to place you or the
government or the defense in any disadvantageous position
to interrupt your responsive argument at this point, I
might do that. However, to require you to go forward at
5:00 in the afternoon late in the day might also be unfair.
I simply ask you and Mr. Brigham if you wish to proceed
with some or all of your argument today or do you wish to
delay the until the morning?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, I think that perhaps we
will wait until tomorrow if it is agreeable to the Court.
The COURT: I have no problem with that.
MS. MILLER: Let me mention that one of the cases
we will be relying on is cited in our memorandum, if the
Court wanted to take a look at it tonight. United States
v. International Minerals and Chemical Corporation 402 U.S.
558. This goes to the point that knowledge of the
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regulations is not required. That will be certainly
something that we will be arguing.
The COURT: All right. Now, then, the question
comes up what time, because we told the jury we would be
back at 9:00. What time do you all recommend that we
commence?
MS. MILLER: Your Honor, certainly no later than
8. If the Court wants to have a little more time in there,
I certainly would be agreeable to start at 7:30.
The COURT: You are entitled, of course, to the
same length of time they had. They had 4 hours. I don't
wish to put you or them in the position of having to get
here at 6:00 or so to do that. I suppose the jury could
wait perhaps 20 or 30 minutes. I wouldn't want them to
wait longer than that.
MS. MILLER: Judge, if you do feel comfortable
with maybe the jury not starting until 9:20 or so, I think
we could start at 8.
The COURT: That would only give you an hour and
twenty minutes.
MS. MILLER: Without any disrespect to counsel, I
just don't think the points they are going to make are
going to take that long.
The COURT: All right then. 8:00 in the morning.
We will commence with the government's response at 8:00 in
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the morning. Thank you.
(Proceedings were concluded at 4:45 P.M.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E
I hereby certify that the foregoing is an accurate
transcription of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
November 29, 1999
________________ _______________________________________
DATE ROBIN MARIE CARBONELLO
Official Federal Court Reporter
Federal Justice Building, Ste. 1127
99 Northeast 4th Street
Miami, FL 33132 - (305)523-5108
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